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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that Positive Psychology, one of the newest branches of 
Psychology, conforms to sets of ideas about the human person which have been 
accepted from within the Western philosophical and scientific traditions, and that 
these ideas obstruct its dual ambitions to provide a balance to the weakness model 
in Psychology and to enhance human flourishing, since these require a 
comprehensive account of the human person. Heidegger’s work is nominated as a 
likely source of remedy, for three key reasons: Both systems of thought share 
superficial similarities which provide the basis for the clarification and development 
of key ideas within Positive Psychology. Further, Positive Psychology can benefit 
from Heidegger’s challenges to assumptions within Philosophy and the sciences. 
Finally, and most importantly, Heidegger’s work can supply the ontological 
underpinning which Positive Psychology needs in order to appreciate the human 
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Introduction 
Background: Phenomenology, Psychology and Positive Psychology 
Over one hundred years ago, phenomenology arose out of the frustrations 
philosophers had with the broad and often invalid assumptions which abounded in 
academic thought, the sciences, and in nascent Psychology. Since that time, the 
reasons for philosophical reservation in relation to Psychology have been well 
rehearsed – but with little discernable effect on mainstream Psychology. Though 
some movements within Psychology have taken these criticisms seriously (namely 
the Phenomenological and Existential streams), for the vast majority it has been a 
case of ‘business as usual’. This ‘business’ focused on describing and treating 
abnormal psychological states, disease and weakness -  in short, the varieties of 
mental illness. More recently, Psychologists have endeavoured to balance this one 
sided approach, by attending to the study and enhancement of mental health and 
wellbeing, and a ‘Positive Psychology’ has emerged. 
 
Positive Psychology is a worthy enterprise, since its goals are beneficent. Primarily, 
Positive Psychology seeks to provide a balance to the ‘weakness model’ of the human 
person, (which centres on the treatment of mental illness), dominant in Psychology, 
by promoting research into human strengths: “at this juncture of living history, what 
Positive Psychology seeks is …recognition as a viable, new paradigm – a rigorous 
science on the positive side of what it means to be human.”1 Clinical psychologists 
have been working on aspects of positive affectivity over past decades, however it 
was Martin Seligman, who ‘provided the necessary spark for Positive Psychology’ as 
a coherent movement during his period as President of the American Psychological 
Association, beginning in 1998.2 He spearheaded this new field within Psychology in 
opposition to the general “unspoken assumption in the social sciences that negative 
                                                 
1 Snyder, C.R.,  &  Lopez, Shane, ‘The future of Positive Psychology’, in  Snyder, C.R.,  &  Lopez, 
Shane (Eds.), The Handbook of Positive Psychology, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 
2005, p. 752 
2 Ibid.; Martin, Mike, ‘Happiness and Virtue in Positive Psychology’, Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 2007, vol. 37, no.1, p. 89 
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traits are authentic and positive traits are derivative.”3 Seligman, (and by extension all 
others who align themselves with Positive Psychology), seeks to move beyond the 
treatment of the mentally ill to provide instead the means to a ‘pleasant life’, a ‘good 
life’ and a ‘meaningful life’ for those who enjoy psychological health. 4  Those 
working within the Positive Psychology model seek to “show what actions lead to 
wellbeing, to positive individuals and to thriving communities’ by adapting ‘what is 
best in the scientific method to the unique problems that human behaviour presents to 
those who wish to understand it in all its complexity.”5 
 
Positive Psychology’s influence began in the United States but is gaining momentum 
around the world, both within academic circles as a field for research and the broader 
community. Here in Australia, Sydney University had its first conference devoted to 
Positive Psychology in 2008,6 and had plans to instigate a post graduate program in 
Positive Psychology in 2009.7 At Sydney’s Geelong Grammar School, ‘Wellbeing 
and Positive Psychology’ has been incorporated within the school culture since 
2007. 8 Now, Positive Psychology is also being used in government schools (like 
Sydney’s Riverside Girls School). 9 In Western Australia, many schools throughout 
the state are using the ‘Optimistic Thinking Skill’, program designed by Curtin 
University to “develop children's social competence, self-management, and positive 
thinking.” 10 Thus investigation into this field, and the assumptions built into the 
                                                 
3 Seligman, Martin, & Csikszentmihalyi, Mihlay, ‘Positive Psychology, An Introduction’, American 
Psychologist, 2000, vol. 55, no.1, p. 12 
4 Seligman, Martin,, Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your 
Potential for Lasting Fulfillment, Random House Australia, Sydney, 2002, p. 249 
5 Seligman, Csikszentmihalyi , ‘Positive Psychology, An Introduction’ p. 7; My emphasis 
6 First Australian Positive Psychology and Well-Being Conference call for papers accessed on 30 July 
2008 from http://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/coach/pp2008/Call_for_Papers_PP2008.pdf 
7 Sydney University , Faculty of Science, Psychology, accessed on 30 July 2008 from 
http://www.science.usyd.edu.au/fstudent/postgrad/research/pgr_psychology.shtml 
8 Wellbeing@GGS accessed on 30 July 2008 from 
http://www.ggs.vic.edu.au/index.asp?menuid=200.020.010 
9 Aedy, Richard ‘Positive Psychology at school’,  Life Matters, Radio National Broadcast, accessed on 
15/05/09from  http://www.abc.net.au/rn/lifematters/stories/2009/2565148.htm 
10 Curtin University of Technology, Aussie Optimism.accessed on 48/04/09, from 
http://psych.curtin.edu.au/research/aussieoptimism/index.cfm 
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techniques it advocates, is timely and has particular importance in the Australian 
context. 
The Method 
For all the good Psychology has achieved over the past century, criticisms of 
Psychology are as valid today as they were in its inception, and there is no exception 
in the case of the latest incarnation of psychological investigation. The assumptions 
implicit within Positive Psychology conceal ad hoc ontological foundations which 
can distort conclusions drawn about the nature of the human person, and in turn, 
affect the legitimacy of claims that arise from within the field. This claim finds 
support in the following thesis via the critical evaluation of Positive Psychology from 
a phenomenological perspective. This evaluation will progress along two main fronts: 
general and particular. In relation to the former, the legitimacy and fecundity of some 
of the broad suppositions inherent in Positive Psychology will be challenged. In the 
main these come in the form of implicit frameworks which Positive Psychology has 
inherited from the Western philosophical and scientific tradition. These include a 
Dualist ontology and the unwavering belief in the merit of empiricism as a means of 
coming to a full understanding of the human person. For the latter, the impact these 
broad assumptions have on Positive Psychology’s theorising in relation to particular 
constructs such as states of mind, the structure of emotion, and the nature of 
authenticity is then critiqued.  
 
The main method of this project, then, is to survey relevant literature in order to 
demonstrate that Heidegger’s ontology (in particular that developed in his early work, 
Being and Time), can make a significant contribution to the theoretical base of 
Positive Psychology. The first chapter, ‘Heidegger’s Relevance for Positive 
Psychology,’ begins the exploration of how his ontic-ontological distinction, and 
treatment of the nature of the sciences and the ‘theoretical attitude’ can elucidate the 
reasons why Positive Psychology’s ambition to arrive at an appreciation of the human 
person in all its complexity is set to flounder.11 In terms of epistemology, Heidegger’s 
                                                 
11 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, John Maquarrie, & Edward Robinson, (Trans.), Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1996, H p. 138 
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work can provide a justification and frame for Positive Psychology’s ontic questions, 
positioning them within an ontological context, thus making them more reliable. 
These themes are continued throughout the thesis as it is argued, in addition to 
providing an ontological grounding, Heidegger’s deconstruction of key ideas within 
the Western philosophical cannon can benefit Positive Psychology. Those 
unexamined ideas which currently frame Positive Psychology are shown as 
obstructive to its aim to gain a complete picture of the human person. It is argued, 
along with Heidegger,  that the human person is distinct in that it is ontological (or 
always operates with a pre-ontological or not yet formally developed understanding 
of the world, the self and others) and thus to understand humanity in all its 
complexity requires an appreciation of this ontological nature. As this argument 
progresses, the comparison between Heidegger’s work and certain ideas within 
Positive Psychology reveals points of similarity, (which may surprise the reader). 
Moreover, these parallels often highlight areas within Positive Psychology which 
need further clarification. This project seeks to point the way towards the use of 
Heidegger’s work as a critique and support for Positive Psychology. To this end, each 
subsequent chapter works on the basis of such a potential similarity between 
Heidegger’s work and Positive Psychology: ‘authenticity’, ‘mind’ and ‘mood’.  
 
The second chapter, ‘Authenticity in Heidegger and Positive Psychology,’ contends 
that the notion of authenticity in Heidegger can expand on that proffered by Positive 
Psychology. Some time is spent ascertaining what the term ‘authenticity’ means for 
Heidegger and how it relates to Being and Time in general. Positive Psychology’s 
conception of authentic happiness is then woven into this framework in order to 
demonstrate some striking parallels, but also that Positive Psychology’s notion of 
authenticity is superficial in relation to Heidegger’s. So, it is suggested that, by 
recourse to Heidegger, Positive Psychology’s use of authenticity can be made more 
potent. 
 
Chapter three, ‘Befindlichkeit and Dualism,’ argues that Positive Psychology would 
benefit from adopting Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit or ‘attunement’ in place of 
   5 
the dualist conception of ‘states of mind.’ The many reasons for this radical shift in 
theoretical orientation are outlined - first with reference to Heidegger’s critique of 
Descartes and then in relation to the obstacles this theoretical outlook creates for 
Positive Psychology. In essence, it is held that since the ‘object’ of Positive 
Psychology’s investigations is the human person, a theoretical bias which 
misinterprets the basic reality of this entity is counter productive. Positive Psychology 
must, of course, operate with a ‘theory of mind’, but this theory should not 
misconstrue the phenomenon of the human experience of cognition as part of engaged 
agency, and thus obstruct Positive Psychology’s aims. Therefore it is recommended 
that the obsolete ontological assumptions Positive Psychology unwittingly makes 
should be eschewed. Furthermore, what this might mean in practical terms for the 
Positive Psychologist is sketched, noting possibilities for future development. 
 
The fourth chapter, ‘Emotion and Mood,’ discusses how Positive Psychology’s view 
of emotion compares with that proffered by Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis 
of moods. The ground is established by a brief description of how Psychology’s 
relation to emotion has changed over time, and how Positive Psychology’s 
understanding of mood has been influenced by this history. Currently there seems to 
be some confusion within Positive Psychology as to what exactly constitutes an 
emotion and whether this concept should be likened to, or differentiated from, mood 
and where it sits in relation to traits, strengths and virtues. These central concepts are 
mapped diagrammatically in order to bring some clarity, before links with 
Heidegger’s notion of mood and attunement are suggested. These links demonstrate 
that connecting Positive Psychology’s view of emotion to Heidegger’s mood creates 
the means for Positive Psychology to account for the human person’s intrinsic 
relation to Being. This brings Positive Psychology closer to the full account of the 
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1. Heidegger’s Relevance for Positive Psychology 
Establishing the Argument 
 
Positive Psychology’s need for an explicitly realised ontological underpinning is the 
dominant theme throughout this project. Rather than beginning the discussion of 
authenticity, mind and mood which will be broached in subsequent sections, the 
following will make a more general case for Heidegger’s relevance to Positive 
Psychology in terms of Heidegger’s ontic-ontological distinction and the epistemic 
reasons for supplying an ontological base. 
 
The Ontic-Ontological Distinction 
Philosophy in general (and Phenomenology in particular) is critical of Psychology’s 
ability to meet its more ambitious aims. Indeed, Seligman is not immune to such 
doubts, expressing the concern, that “a science of positive emotion will merely float 
on the waves of self-improvement fashions unless it is anchored by deeper 
premises.”12 Positive Psychologists frequently give the false impression that since the 
‘weakness model’ in Psychology can now be balanced, the human person will finally 
be studied ‘in its entirety’. For example, Snyder and Lopez claim that “Positive 
Psychology unfetters the search for understanding all aspects of human nature”13 but 
such enthusiasm does not grant that the methods Psychology has at its disposal are 
inadequate to the task. This theoretical blind spot has been noted in the past. As far 
back as 1927, Heidegger complained that “pure psychology” merely made “one-sided 
reflections” which “are only possible on the basis of the concrete totality of man.”14  
For Heidegger, this concrete totality includes both ontic and ontological 
considerations, which he is often at pains to differentiate. Throughout this work, 
ontology is taken to mean the investigation into the nature of existence or Being as 
                                                 
12 Seligman, Authentic Happiness, p. 251 
13 Snyder & Lopez ‘The future of Positive Psychology’,  p. 753; My emphasis 
14 Letter to Husserl dated 22 October 1927, quoted in Guignon, Charles, ‘Moods in Heidegger’s Being 
and Time’, in Solomon, Robert, What is an emotion? Classic And Contemporary Readings, 
(2nd ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 181 
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such. In other words, ontology asks “what is being as being”.15 Heidegger seeks the 
answer to this question through an “analytic of Da-sein”: the investigation of the 
ontological nature of the human person in its particular relation to Being.16 Although 
each individual has an existential (ontological) reality, in that each person is an 
exemplar of that entity which relates to Being, it is important to recognise that the 
‘analytic of Dasein’ relates to ontological structures as such. Particular examples of 
this ontological structure would require recourse to the ontic domain, and so 
Heidegger demarcated them as Daseinanalysis.17 The ‘analytic of Dasein’ must be 
kept separate from an analysis of individual existentiell (ontic) reality, in which the 
individual is such and such person, existing at this point in time, with this family 
these likes and dislikes etc. This kind of investigation would be closer to an ‘ontic 
anthropology’ but which would ideally bear “the stamp of the analytic of Dasein”. 18 
 
The difficulty comes as the Psychologist seeks an answer for which he cannot frame 
the question. To explain: the Psychologist, who approaches the human person from 
the standpoint of science, necessarily adopts a ‘theoretical outlook’. Thus the 
Psychologist who seeks to understand ‘all aspects of human nature’ asks ontic 
questions in the hope of revealing the whole of human reality which necessarily 
presupposes the ontological structures of the human person. The project must fail due 
to an inconsistency between the objective (which is in part ontological) and the means 
to that objective (which is purely ontic). Heidegger makes the distinction between 
these two modes of inquiry clear, saying that ontological “inquiry is indeed more 
primordial, as over and against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences.”19 This is 
not to say that there is no place for ontic investigation. In fact, the theoretical attitude, 
which creates a distinction between the subject and the object under investigation, has 
been immensely fruitful: the great technological advances of the recent era would not 
have been possible without it. It must be recognised, however, that these very 
                                                 
15 Heidegger, Martin, Zollikon Seminars, Protocols-Conversations-Letters, Boss, Medard (Ed.), (Mayr, 
Franz, & Askay, Richard, Trans.), Northwestern University Press, Illinois, 2001, p. 122 
16 Ibid. p. 125 
17 Ibid. pp. 124 -125 
18 Ibid. p. 125 
19 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 11 
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techniques which dim the experience of Being through engagement with the world 
are disadvantageous to the clear-sighted construction of a theory of the human person 
as such, for the human person is “distinctive in that it is ontological.”20  
 
Ontic examination of human traits cannot fully explicate the nature of the human 
person, since it must be silent with regard to ontology. Though the “roots of the 
existential analytic…are ultimately existentiell, that is, ontical” an ontological 
investigation requires a phenomenological method, rather than the theoretical 
attitude. 21  Phenomenology allows for an appreciation of everyday experience as 
engaged agency whereas scientific investigation approaches the human person as 
already disengaged, the subject of an experiment - split into a mind and a body. Thus 
the scientific method, the principal tool of the Psychologist, has no access to the 
essential, ontological, aspects of the human reality, which results in Positive 
Psychology drawing conclusions based on ad hoc and unrecognised ontological 
foundations. 22  This deficiency, noted at Psychology’s inception, has not been 
successfully redressed. As Psychology’s latest manifestation, Positive Psychology 
deserves the opportunity to respond. The use of arguments from within 
Phenomenology, specifically those of Heidegger, will highlight these deficiencies 
inherent within Positive Psychology so that they may be rectified, thus making the 
field more substantial. If successful, this critique will make Positive Psychology a 
more robust discipline: a rigorous ontic science of the human subject, strengthened 
and informed by an explicit ontology. This should go some way to assuaging 
Seligman’s concern.  
Epistemic Considerations 
The focus of this thesis is not the dismantling of Positive Psychology’s epistemic 
orientation. However, the case for the incorporation of a developed ontology cannot 
be made without at least some reference to epistemological considerations. In any 
                                                 
20 Heidegger, Being and Time, H pp. 138, 12 
21 Ibid. H p. 13; The particulars of the theoretical attitude will be covered in more detail in Chapter 3. 
22 Or, in Maslow’s words, ‘the unconscious, unexamined philosophies that they picked up as children.’ 
Maslow, Abraham, ‘Existential Psychology – What’s in it for Us?’ in May, Rollo, (Ed.) 
Existential Psychology, Random House, New York, 1966, p. 54 
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case, Philosophical honesty requires that one confess one’s own epistemological bias. 
Note, however, that while epistemic concerns are raised, they are not treated in great 
depth. 
 
Apart from the difficulties Positive Psychology suffers as a discipline (mentioned 
above), it is internally coherent. In general, those engaged in the field share an 
appreciation for Cognitive Theory, they acknowledge that there is an “urgent” need to 
“redress the balance” within Psychology to “supplement what we know about 
madness with knowledge about sanity,” and they posit that the inclusion of some 
form of Virtue theory into the discipline is the best means of achieving this.23 Internal 
coherence should be the standard for any branch of learning, so while it is valuable; it 
is not, in itself, praiseworthy. In fact, the sole reliance on Coherentism has created, 
(all-be-they unrecognised), difficulties for Positive Psychology, since “beliefs can be 
comprehensively coherent without amounting to knowledge.” 24  To explain, a 
discipline may have a system of coherent beliefs which are nonetheless false. 
Alternatively, beliefs which cohere with each other may be true, but due to simple 
luck. For Positive Psychology, the former does not seem to be the case, since the area 
has had remarkable success; its theories are borne out by experimental data and 
increases in reported subjective wellbeing. The pragmatist would likely retort that the 
fecundity of the scientific method is ample demonstration of its value as the means to 
attaining knowledge. In reply, it should be noted that ontic investigations will only 
discover the answers to the questions thy pose, and since (it is argued here) there is 
more to the human person than a mere ontic examination can reveal, the pragmatist 
only knows part of the story. This means the latter is likely: it is just coincidence that 
Positive Psychology operates with true belief, since the rationalization for belief 
cannot come from within the circle of coherent ideas, and no support has been sought 
from without. It is true that Positive Psychology has collected and incorporated 
beliefs and systems which cohere with its central beliefs, but this does not amount to 
                                                 
23 Seligman, Authentic Happiness, p. 256 
24 Sosa, Ernest, ‘Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity’, in Keith DeRose and Ted 
Warfield (Eds.) Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1999 p. 97 
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justification. Positive Psychology’s devotion to the scientific method has produced 
success simply because the results gained so far just-so-happen to align with the 
ontological structures of the human person. Making these ontological structures 
explicit and incorporating them into the justification for Positive Psychology’s 
knowledge makes the whole practice more robust. 
 
That the methods employed by Positive Psychologists will not assist in the adequate 
justification of their core beliefs can be seen in the following example. 25  To 
determine how the good life might be lived, and whether the discernment of factors 
intrinsic to the good life was ubiquitous, a team of Positive Psychologists examined a 
range of philosophical and theological systems. These included Confucianism, 
Hinduism, Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy, and the Bushido samurai code. 
From these, six core virtues were distilled: wisdom, courage, love, justice, 
temperance and spirituality.26 This form of investigation seems to have been favoured 
on pragmatic grounds. On the one hand, looking to the traditions of the world in order 
to gain insight into the ‘good life’ may be expedient, or perhaps even wise, on the 
other hand; it may just be a form of argumentum ad populum, argumentum ad 
participans or an argument from the status quo. In any case, a cross cultural 
taxonomy of virtue was collated for use in developing an “agreed upon classification 
system” which could be used to diagnose and enhance the experience of “authentic 
happiness” in the general population.27 However, rather than acting as a means of 
justification, these systems have merely become part of the “web of belief” – a 
network which seems to be true, but not for any significant or steadfast reason. A 
significant reason would more likely come from the analysis of virtue in light of the 
nature of the human person, than from an assortment of traditions. 
 
For Positive Psychology to be assured of future success in its task and to gain 
epistemological rigour, the element of luck must be removed. Two possible ways this 
may be achieved are suggested here. The first endorses a Reliabilist account of 
                                                 
25 This example is reiterated in Chapter 3. 
26 Seligman, Authentic Happiness, p. 11 
27 Seligman, Authentic Happiness, pp. 131-132 
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knowledge. For the Reliabilist, knowledge is justified because an external (or 
objective) connection is made between the truth of the belief and the belief-producing 
cognitive process. 28  In other words, the beliefs of which Positive Psychology is 
comprised may be made more reliable by the recourse to an external qualification of 
such a belief-producing process. To take the above example, the belief that the 
enactment of the virtues enhances happiness in the virtuous was corroborated in the 
ad hoc way described. While it is true, the process through which the Positive 
Psychologists arrived at the belief was flawed and thus did not arguably produce 
reliable knowledge. The preference for that particular method (the assemblage of 
examples) was most likely generated by the scientific culture Positive Psychology 
prides itself on. This process is suited to the general tasks the Positive Psychologist is 
presented with in her investigation into ontic questions. However the question “why 
are the virtues conducive to happiness?” or, alternatively, “why is this true?” remains 
unanswered. The mere collection of Virtue theories is unsuitable to the task of 
providing an external connection between the belief that virtue enhances happiness 
and the truth of that belief. Therefore, this belief would be strengthened by 
verification derived from an external source. This requires that Positive Psychology 
reach beyond ontic considerations, outside its network of beliefs about the means to 
achieving happiness, toward the discovery of the prerequisite of these means. To be 
made reliable, Positive Psychology requires the addition of a different method of 
investigation, one that is “opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental 
findings”. 29 One such suitable methodology is phenomenology. In other words, 
verification of the beliefs which make up the basic premises of Positive Psychology 
must come from an assessment of the phenomena itself; that is, from within 
ontology.30  
 
How Positive Psychology can make its beliefs more robust through Reliabilism 
deserves further explication. To take a different example, it is true, as Positive 
                                                 
28 Axtell, Guy, Knowledge Belief and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, accessed on 
12/12/2008, from http://www.scsr.nevada.edu/~axtell/introduction.html, p. 5 
29 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 28 
30 Ibid.; N.B. Heidegger describes phenomenology as the methodology of ontology. 
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Psychology suggests, that emotional states are a pervasive aspect of human life, that 
“a positive mood jolts us into an entirely different way of thinking from a negative 
mood” and that there is barely any gap between.31 That this is the case is observable 
in the laboratory as subjects’ temperature is measured and affective states are 
recorded. But such confirmation of the structure of mood, derived from ontic 
methodology, is again unsuitable to the task of providing an external connection 
between the belief that moods are omnipresent and the truth of that belief. Absent is 
the response to the question “why are moods pervasive?” The answer, which can 
create the necessary truth-connection, comes from an understanding of the nature of 
the human person, an understanding gained through the use of a different 
methodology: phenomenology. Furthermore, that such an approach has potential 
fecundity is evident in this example. The insight that there is ‘barely any gap 
between’ which Seligman proposes so tentatively can be affirmed and strengthened 
once Heidegger’s views of the human person are accepted. There is no gap between 
one mood and another for that “we are never free of moods” is an ontological 
reality.32 In other words, that we are always subject to some mood is characteristic of 
the kinds of beings we are. In each case, Process Reliabilism obliges Positive 
Psychology to move beyond its traditional ontic methodology and to seek justification 
for its beliefs in ontology.  
 
The foregoing pre-empts the second way in which the element of epistemological 
luck involved in Positive Psychology’s successes can be removed. In short, the work 
of Positive Psychology may be bolstered if provided with a foundation in 
Heideggerian ontology. The term ‘foundation’ is used reluctantly, since it connotes a 
Cartesian bias which will be rejected later in this work. Foundationalism has its critics, 
and rightly so. Broadly, their opposition takes the form that it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to identify any criterion which is ‘suitably primal’ to act as the basis of 
                                                 
31 Seligman, Authentic happiness, pp. 41, 38,  xiv 
32 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 136; This point will be developed further in Chapter 4. 
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knowledge. 33 Indeed, it is unhelpful to suggest that Positive Psychology should be 
precariously balanced on one ‘clear and certain’ point. Rather, Positive Psychology 
should be embedded within the larger context of the entirety of meanings, phenomena, 
and experiences which constitute human being, which is a Being-in-the-world. 34 
Heidegger makes the connection between a person’s Being and their place in the 
world.35 The point is that existence of the self entails the existence of a world, and 
that, to borrow Wittgenstein’s phrase, “‘the limits of my world are the limits of 
myself’.” 36 Therefore, to seek to use Heidegger’s ontology as the foundation for 
Positive Psychology is to set the latter within  a larger system of coherence, since the 
scientist can only understand herself as the kind of being which 1) relates to Being, 
and 2) which has a  ‘world’. There is nothing ‘outside’ this system of meaning. The 
‘limit’ of knowledge is, therefore, the existence of Dasein, with its world and relation 
to Being. Or in other words the existence of Dasein, the ontological structures of 
Dasein is ‘suitably primal.’  
 
Every human endeavour, including ontic investigation, is inescapably conducted 
within this context: for as “ways in which man behaves, sciences have the manner of 
Being which this entity – man himself – possesses.”37 All investigation operates with 
this prior understanding of the nature of the subject; else the investigation could not 
begin.38 One needs a sense of what one is looking for before a search can start.  All 
science, including Positive Psychology operates with this implicit understanding of 
Being, because science is conducted by Dasein, which has a privileged relation to 
Being. So, making the phenomenological structure of the ontological base of Positive 
Psychology explicit creates a suitable underpinning for the field:   
Laying the foundations, as we have described it…leaps 
ahead, as it were, into some area of Being, discloses it for 
                                                 
33 Taylor, Charles, ‘What’s Wrong with Foundationalism?: Knowledge Agency and World’ in Wrathal, 
Mark, & Malpas, Jeff, (Eds.), Heidegger, Coping and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of 
Herbert L. Dreyfus, Vol.2, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 116-117 
34 Heidegger’s use of the term Dasein will be treated in detail in Chapter 2. 
35 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 54 
36 Young, Julian, Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 
58-59 
37 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 11 
38 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p. 125 
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the first time in the constitution of its Being, and …makes 
it available to the positive sciences…39 
 
For Heidegger, a key task is to make the implicit relation to Being (under which the 
sciences necessarily operate) explicit, to disclose the “possibility of those ontologies 
themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their 
foundations.” 40 Heidegger notes that the nature of the human person is generally 
“tacitly assumed as something ‘self evidently’ ‘given’… [and that] the decisive 
ontological foundations of anthropological problematics remain undetermined.” 41 
Importantly for the current project, he argues that this “is no less true of 
‘psychology’”. 42 Therefore, since one aspect of Heidegger’s work seeks to describe 
the structures that are is necessarily prior to science; it is reasonable that Positive 
Psychology should be founded on Heidegger’s ontology. In sum, the external 
criterion which this thesis recommends for Positive Psychology’s knowledge is also 
that which is most primal, the ontological structures of human existence. Heidegger’s 
work, (in particular that contained in Being and Time), is put forward as the ontology 
which is most likely to be of service to Positive Psychology, for three main reasons: 
 
Firstly, Heidegger’s ontology is more accurate than previous investigations into 
Being and the human relation to it. Since its method is phenomenology, it does not 
fall victim to the fractured reality which blights constructs derived from the 
theoretical attitude. Note, that given the complexity of the subject, it would be 
foolhardy to posit that Heidegger’s formulation is entirely accurate, and that is 
certainly not what is being suggested here. Rather, his ontology is more accurate than 
other possible ontologies due to its phenomenological method. Using phenomenology, 
Heidegger seeks to exhume the assumptions and philosophical games of the past 
which, rather than bringing metaphysics closer to an understanding of human being 
                                                 
39 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 10 
40 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 11; see also Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p. 128 
41 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 49 
42 Ibid.  
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and its relation to Being as such, obscured the task. Through phenomenology, 
Heidegger sought to return to “the things themselves!” 43 
 
Secondly, since Heidegger’s task is to challenge the assumptions inherent within 
Philosophy, this can in turn serve to challenge the assumptions at work within 
Positive Psychology – of which there are many. Since Positive Psychology does not 
have an explicit ontology (theory of Being and then how the human person relates to 
Being), it has assumed a gaggle of ontological presuppositions which have found 
their way from within the Western philosophical canon into common thought. Taking 
inspiration from Heidegger, this thesis will endeavour to make these assumptions 
plain, and will use Heidegger’s critique of the underlying philosophical constructs to 
demonstrate why these assumptions are often detrimental to Positive Psychology’s 
primary aims.  
 
Thirdly, although Heidegger can be classed within the tradition of thought which is 
commonly characterised by the negative outlook which Positive Psychology deplores, 
the two approaches to the human person share some important similarities. For 
instance, both Heidegger and Positive Psychology treat authenticity in terms of 
temporality and give a central place to mood as formative for a person’s engagement 
with the world. Granted, these thematic similarities differ in detail, which can only be 
expected since Heidegger is concerned with ontological structures of human being, 
whereas Positive Psychology approaches these subjects ontically. Far from 
representing a difficulty, these differences in approach are advantageous, since this 
project seeks to use Heidegger’s ontology as a supportive framework for Positive 
Psychology’s ontic endeavours. In relation to Heidegger’s so called ‘negative 
attitude’, it is not the lone emphasis within his work. In fact, although Heidegger 
discusses fear, boredom, indifference, sadness, melancholy and desperation, he also 
notes the place of hope, joy, enthusiasm, equanimity, gaiety, and elation in our 
                                                 
43 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 28  
   16 
everyday experience.44 The content of Heidegger’s work may not be balanced on the 
whole, however, the theoretical thrust may well be:  
Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to 
face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, 
there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility.45 
 
It is perhaps this ‘unshakable joy’ contained in the possibility for each individual to 
realise their own ‘potentiality-for-Being’ that is the most inspiring similarity between 




















                                                 
44 Guignon, Charles, ‘Moods in Heidegger’s Being and Time’, in Solomon, Robert, 2003, What is an 
emotion? Classic And Contemporary Readings, 2003, p. 184 
45 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 310 
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2. Authenticity in Heidegger and Positive Psychology  
What does authenticity mean for Heidegger, and how does it relate to Positive 
Psychology’s conception of authentic happiness? 
 
The forgoing discussion noted that Positive Psychology, like the positive sciences in 
general, operates within a set of unquestioned assumptions. It was suggested 
moreover, that these assumptions, while being beneficial to the development of 
modern science, are disadvantageous to the clear-sighted construction of a theory of 
the human person. Obviously, a coherent theory of the human person is essential to 
the field of psychology in general and Positive Psychology in particular. So, in order 
to supply this much needed theoretical underpinning, the task becomes one of laying 
bare implicit assumptions that they may be assessed as favourable or unfavourable to 
Positive Psychology, and of providing a more constructive set of primary principles 
where needed.   
 
The overarching aim of this research is to see whether Heidegger’s ontology may 
provide this coherent and constructive set of founding principles, which is lacking in 
Positive Psychology. Given that both Heidegger and Positive Psychology make use of 
the notion of authenticity, it seems likely that Heidegger’s theorising on the nature of 
human Being could indeed act as a context for Positive Psychology. The way in 
which Positive Psychology and Heidegger use the idea of authenticity is, however, 
different: Firstly, they approach the idea of authenticity from the perspective of 
different fields: psychology and ontology. Secondly, this means that they operate on 
different levels of engagement with Being: ontic and ontological. If it becomes clear 
that these two notions of authenticity are incommensurable, then this project is set to 
be unsuccessful. Thus a clear description of the ways in which both Heidegger and 
Positive Psychology use the notion of authenticity is essential. Once this is 
accomplished, the two conceptions of authenticity are compared and contrasted in 
order to demonstrate the ways in which that they might usefully work together. 
 
In order to achieve these aims, this chapter first outlines Heidegger’s use of 
‘authenticity’ briefly describing how the concept sits within the general scope of his 
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thought. For ease, this explanation is broken into sections on fundamental ontology, 
temporality, inauthentic temporality then authentic temporality. Following this, a 
critique of the loose way in which Positive Psychology employs ‘authenticity’ and 
related terms, supports an argument for the inclusion of Heidegger’s developed 
articulation of authentic Being.  First, Positive Psychology does not provide a definite 
account of authenticity, thus its use of the word lacks clarity. Heidegger can furnish 
an articulate account (which is not too distant in content from the beginnings which 
are offered by Positive Psychology) and thus can make authenticity a more 
meaningful aspect of Positive Psychology’s endeavour. Secondly, at some points 
Positive Psychology casts authenticity as exclusively connected with the present, 
while at others it extends authenticity across past, present and future. Heidegger’s 
rendering of the temporal nature of authenticity, when linked with Positive 
Psychology, can assist in overcoming this contradiction. Thirdly, Positive Psychology 
may inadvertently promote inauthenticity in its question for authenticity through 
gratification. However, if gratification is coupled with Heidegger’s ‘resoluteness’, 
this potential pitfall can be avoided. 
  
Fundamental Ontology 
To understand Heidegger’s use of the notion of authenticity, one must have 
knowledge of the thrust of his work overall. Describing Heidegger’s project is 
difficult, not least because of his (so called) ‘tormented language,’ made more 
obscure at times by the various ways in which it is translated into English and 
rendered throughout the secondary literature.46 The matter is compounded further by 
the circular evolution of his thought, where one set of insights leads onto another, 
which calls the reader to revisit and clarify the first: tracing out a hermeneutic 
circle.47 A primary reading of Heidegger’s Being and Time then, would take his task 
(continued in subsequent works such as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology) as 
the reclamation of the ‘question of Being’ from what he saw as tired and rigid ‘self-
                                                 
46 Kaufmann, Walter, From Shakespeare to Existentialism, Anchor Books, New York, 1960, pp. 339, 
365 
47 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 17;  Stephen Mulhall, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to 
Heidegger and Being and Time, (2nd ed.), Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 31 
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evident’ structures of theorising within metaphysics, which have been passed down 
through the history of Western philosophy.48 We must emphasise the qualification 
that this is a primary reading, which allows for the shifts which necessarily develop 
within Heidegger’s later work, and for the dissention within the ranks of 
Heideggerain scholars. 49  Thomas Sheehan, for example, against the mainstream 
interpretation of Heidegger, is adamant that “Heidegger’s central topic is not 
‘being’”50  and that “Heidegger’s focal topic never was being in any of its forms”.51 
Sheehan’s point, whilst at odds with many, is nuanced and appears faithful to 
Heidegger’s intention. The meaning of Sheehan’s perspective will become clearer 
below. 
 
In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that traditional views of Being obstruct an 
accurate account of Being by tacitly assuming a human subject which is nothing more 
than a thinking ‘thing’: “Ontologically, every idea of a ‘subject’…still points to the 
subjectum along with it...Thinghood itself which such reification implies.” 52 Left 
unexamined, this notion has generated some of philosophy’s most well known 
conundrums such as the evasiveness of the ‘proof of reality’, the ‘mind body 
problem’ and the “theoretical problematic of understanding the psychical life of 
others” or in other words, the ‘problem of other minds.’53 According to Heidegger, 
these seeming paradoxes, (“with which first-year philosophy students have been 
tormented since time immemorial” 54 ) are nothing but the outcome of the 
misconception of the fundamental question of Being, and of our relation to it. Thus, 
the ‘tormented language’ which readers of Heidegger often bemoan is the result of his 
                                                 
48 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 21-22 
49 Sheehan, Thomas, ‘A paradigm shift in Heidegger research,’ Continental Philosophy Review’ pp. 
183-185 accessed on 15/04/09 from 
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52 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 46 
53 Ibid. H pp. 205, 60, 124 
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attempt to avoid entrenched nomenclature which has beleaguered past scholarship, 
and fed into the misinterpretation of Being. 
 
Heidegger sets out to critically engage lingering philosophical misinterpretations of 
Being. It is an ambitious (some would say arrogant) aim to set aside the tradition of 
which you are a part in order to ascertain the ‘true’ nature of Being which two 
thousand years of metaphysics ‘misconstrued.’ Heidegger is resolute, however, that 
the confusion can be overcome, if slowly. In order to “destroy the traditional content 
of ancient ontology” with its various assumptions, Heidegger employs a particular 
mode of inquiry – phenomenology – which he maintains is the only method which 
makes “ontology possible.” 55 In its interrogation of Being, phenomenology looks to 
“the things themselves!” in how they manifest in our everyday lives, rather than 
relying on the distillation of academic tradition.56 These ‘things’ which shall be the 
focus of this method are the variety of beings which fill our worlds, for “Being is 
always the Being of an entity.”57 Since ontology is always the study of the being of 
entities, Heidegger chose “that entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein 
in order to confront the cardinal problem – the question of the meaning of Being in 
general.” 58  In other words, Heidegger chose the human person as “the primary 
example to be interrogated in the question of Being”. 59  While this has the 
disadvantage that this phenomena is “ontologically that which is farthest” (for the 
same reason that one cannot see the forest whilst in it), it has the advantage that the 
human person is that entity which has a natural proclivity toward the understanding of 
Being. 60 The human person is “ontologically distinguished by the fact that, in its very 
Being, that Being is an issue for it”. 61 
 
                                                 
55 Young, Heidegger, philosophy, Nazism, p. 22, 36 
56 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 28 
57 Ibid. H p. 9 
58 Ibid. H p. 37 
59 Ibid. H p. 8 
60 Ibid. H p. 15 
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Heidegger takes a common German word –Dasein– as a starting point for his 
investigation of the human person. 62  The term is apt since, in German it is an 
ontological term, in so far as it sets humanity and the type of being it instantiates 
apart from other modes of being.63 When translated, ‘Dasein’ is commonly rendered 
literally as ‘there-being’ or ‘Being-there’, as in the Maquarrie and Robinson 
translation of Being and Time. Sheehan views the translation of ‘Da’ as ‘there’ as 
“one of the least happy moves of Heidegger-scholarship” arguing that “Heidegger 
understands Da not as “the there” but as “the open.””64 Hofstadter, along a similar 
vein, reads the term ‘Dasein’ as “to-be-da” which casts the human being as “the 
mediator between being and beings, the one who holds open the difference between 
them.”65 This rendering is more fruitful since it emphasises the role Dasein plays in 
relation to Being.  Dasein is set apart because of the particular relationship it has with 
Being: “Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.” 66   That we 
understand ourselves in relation to our existence – that we have a possibility to be or 
not to be a particular way – is peculiar to Dasein.67  
 
Dasein’s understanding of Being is “pre-ontological” in that it is generally not 
explicit in a theoretical sense, but is evidenced in the ways in which we think about 
ourselves, our lives and the ways in which we interact with the other beings we 
encounter.68  Moreover, the notion of Being is only meaningful given the existence of 
that entity which can conceive of, or better, have a relationship toward, Being.69 
Hofstadter makes the point that unless  
there is an openness, a clearing in which the distinction 
between being and beings can appear…there can be no 
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such phenomena at all as beings, being and their mutual 
belonging together.70 
 
 This reciprocity between Being and Dasein must be highlighted. Dasein is the entity 
which provides this ‘clearing’, and by “rendering things intelligible-as, the clearing 
gives being.”71 This ‘clearing’ is afforded by the fact that we are, fundamentally, 
‘sense making creatures’ – we apply “references” and “assignments” to the entities 
which surround us and thus create the totality of the world in which we operate.72  In 
other words, humans are the ‘openness’ which allows beings to be made present and 
for Being to be perceived. 73  We are now in a position to revisit Sheehan’s earlier 
insight: “Heidegger’s central topic is not being…but rather what he calls the 
“clearing” of and for being…the Da of Sein”. 74  In Being and Time, Heidegger 
interrogates the nature of Dasein, that entity which is peculiar in its instinctive 
understanding and relation to Being, in order to prepare the ground for the 
investigation of Being as such. Or, in Heidegger’s words, the “question of Being is 
nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs 
to Dasein itself – the pre-ontological understanding of Being.” 75  This settles the 
question of the subject matter of the phenomenology: “fundamental ontology …must 
be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein.”76  
Temporality 
Heidegger is vague, at some points, in relation to the precise way in which Dasein 
understands Being, saying we “understand something like Being” or that there is 
“some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being” or again, “somehow the 
Dasein knows something about being.” 77 At others, he is direct: “whenever Dasein 
tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its 
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standpoint.” 78 This does not mean ‘time’ in the sense of that which we read off our 
clocks, that which we ‘waste’ and that which we regularly ‘run out of’, but the unity 
of past, present and future – Temporality. 79 “Temporal projection makes possible the 
objectification of Being and assures conceptualizability, and thereby constitutes 
ontology in general as…a Temporal science.”80 The interrelationship between Dasein, 
Being and time is complex because they are related through this mechanism of 
‘projection.’  ‘Projection’ is the term Heidegger uses to describe the “existential 
structure of understanding”.81 All that is understood is projected upon a ‘horizon’, 
where the ‘horizon’ is that which enables understanding.82 Given that we are ‘sense 
making creatures,’ ‘projection’ takes an important place in our relation to Being and 
time.  Hoftsadter explains that, 
Being is itself the horizon for beings: they are 
encountered and understood only as they are projected 
upon their own being as horizon. But being itself needs 
another horizon to be projected upon if it is to be 
understood…and it is time which is the horizon upon 
which being itself is projected.83  
 
In other words, we understand ourselves, as individual beings, in the context of Being, 
and we understand Being in light of Temporality. Importantly for the question we are 
examining here, this “projective understanding can either be authentic or 
inauthentic.”84 
Inauthentic temporality 
In order to be as philosophically honest as he could, Heidegger sought not to predict 
the relations between Dasein and Being, and then to make a case for his prediction, 
but to assess Dasein’s nature “proximally and for the most part”; or how this 
manifests “as a rule”, “in the “with one another” of publicness”.85  This means he 
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seeks Dasein in its “average everydayness”.86 The ‘average everydayness’ of Dasein 
is characterised by inauthenticity since we simply, 
understand ourselves in an everyday way…not 
authentically in the strict sense of the word, not with 
constancy from the most proper and most extreme 
possibilities of our own existence, but inauthentically…87 
 
Heidegger observes that ‘proximally and for the most part’, we are absorbed in what 
we are doing at any one moment, caught up in our affairs, and the affairs of others. 
Inauthenticity is generally the character of the bustle of our lives “– when busy, when 
excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment.” 88  As Guignon puts it, 
“[i]nauthentic Dasein is dispersed into a multiplicity of humdrum routines”.89 We 
keep ourselves occupied with the “idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity” that 
characterises the “fallenness” of the everyday. 90 As a rule, we lose our selves in the 
“publicness of the “they”” – the ‘they’ being “not this one not that one, not oneself, 
not some people and not the sum of them all.”91  This highlights the fact that, in 
everyday life, one does not guide daily action by the vision of the ‘extreme 
possibilities’ of one’s existence, but rather fails “to stand by one’s Self” by neglecting 
this vision.92 
 
Heidegger is careful to point out that the idea of inauthenticity “does not signify any 
‘less’ Being or any ‘lower’ degree of Being” since “even in the mode of 
inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies a priori.” 93  This structure is, of 
course, temporal. Dasein relates to Being as projected upon the horizon of 
Temporality, where past present and future are inexorably intertwined as a “future 
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which makes present in the process of having been”.94  When engaged in ‘average 
everydayness’, Dasein has an inauthentic relation to each of these, which is ‘closed’ 
to the promise inherent in everyone.  
 
For Heidegger, the present is formed through relation to the past and future. If Dasein 
is not resolute, what is present, for the most part, “gets entangled in its own self, lets 
itself be drawn along by things… [so that] the past becomes a forgetting and the 
future becomes an expecting”.95 In the inauthentic present, Dasein’s “thrownness gets 
“closed off”” from the extreme possibilities of its existence.96 We get lost in the 
banalities of the present, absorbed in what Heidegger calls ‘making present’ or 
‘enpresenting’.97 In the face of thrownness, Dasein is “irresolute”, and “flees to the 
relief which comes with the supposed freedom of the they-self.” 98  In fact, it is the 
‘they’ that keeps Dasein from “taking the possibilities of Being.”99 As ‘fallen’, the 
“Dasein makes no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself 
in inauthenticity.” 100 This irresolute stance toward the present is supported by the 
‘forgetting’ of the past. This type of forgetting is not to be confused with ordinary 
lapses in memory, for it signifies something much more grave: the denial, or “backing 
away in the face of” what one has been. 101 (This in turn impacts on the present, since 
it is always what we have been which shapes what we are here and now.) Inauthentic 
existence means that what “we are – and what we have been is always contained in 
this – lies somewhere behind us, forgotten.”102 This irresolute forgetfulness creates 
the conditions for Dasein’s relationship with a future where “Dasein has forgotten its 
ownmost thrown potentiality-for-Being”.103 As inauthentic “existence is lost in the 
dispersal of making present” the future becomes obscured by involvement in the 
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‘they’ and the necessities of the now.104 Heidegger names this disposition toward the 
future ‘expecting’ or ‘awaiting.’105 An inauthentic existence causes us to forget who 
we were, lose who we are and so give up what we can be.   
Authentic temporality 
As in the case of inauthenticity, authenticity is “characterized by a distinctive 
temporal structure.” 106  Inauthenticity and authenticity, whilst having the same 
ontological structure relate to the past, present and future differently.107 The main 
difference is whilst inauthentic Dasein flounders in the present (forgetting the past 
and ignoring the possibilities of the future), the authentic Dasein is primarily 
futural.108 Heidegger uses the active “anticipation” rather than the passive ‘awaiting’ 
to describe the authentic attitude toward the future, and this dynamic is evidenced in 
its impact on the present and the past. 109  The authentic present is set apart by 
‘resoluteness,’ the attitude in which we act in the present in accordance with our 
imagined future.110 When ‘enpresenting’ is coupled with ‘resoluteness’, the present 
moment is not an unthinking drifting with the currents of the moment, but is the 
‘instant’ in which the decision to pursue a particular potential for self actualization is 
made real.111 Heidegger expresses it well: 
resoluteness is our name for authentic existence, the 
existence of the Dasein in which the Dasein is itself in 
and from its own most peculiar possibility, a possibility 
that has been seized on and chosen by the Dasein.112 
 
This possibility is realized against the backdrop of the ultimate conclusion of our own 
particular future. When Dasein understands the inevitability of its own “death, Dasein 
stands before itself in its ownmost-potentiality-for-Being.” 113 Guignon explains that 
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we are ““being-toward-death not in the sense of facing our demise or fulfilling our 
potential, but in the sense that everything we do contributes to making us people of a 
particular sort.” 114 The future or ‘being-toward-death’ provides the context for our 
self creation. Likewise the past contributes to the development of our potential, since 
what we have been, and the world of meaning into which we have been thrown, 
determines what we can be in the future. The link to the past comes in the form of the 
“fateful repetition of possibilities that have been”.115 We understand our ‘selves’ from 
what we have been in the past and project this into the future which gives shape to the 
present moment. In other words, the “present that is held in resoluteness is held in the 
specific future (self precedence) and past (repetition) of resoluteness.” 116 
 
But if one is in a state of inauthenticity, how is the recovery of authenticity possible? 
Inauthenticity “can be reversed only if Dasein specifically brings itself back to itself 
from its lostness in the They.”117 Escape from the ‘lost state’ is facilitated by the 
“voice of conscience” which “has the character of the appeal to Dasein by calling it to 
its ownmost potentiality for Being”.118 Precisely how “Dasein’s spontaneous, boot-
strapping response to the call of conscience” occurs is left unanswered – which is 
unsatisfactory to the curious mind. 119 Mulhall goes so far as to posit a third person as 
the caller –an ‘authentic friend’ or even Heidegger himself.120 This is an unnecessary 
step, particularly since Heidegger is quite clear that “the call undoubtedly does not 
come from someone else who is with me in the world.”121 Rather it is Dasein’s 
“ownmost potentiality-for-Being-itself functions as the caller”. 122 For Heidegger, the 
demand for verification of the shared experience of the call which “comes from me 
and yet from beyond me” rests “upon an ontological perversion of the 
phenomenon.”123 Conscience is that which calls us from inauthenticity to authenticity, 
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by challenging us to ‘choose to make the choice’ to live in authentic relation to our 
own existence.124 
Normative or Descriptive? 
To reiterate an earlier significant point, Heidegger does not advise whether 
authenticity or inauthenticity is the preferred mode of existence. To do so is 
extraneous to his purpose in describing the essential structures of Dasein in order to 
reveal the nature of Being. Both reveal the nature of Dasein’s relation to Being. 
Guignon and Mulhall, however, posit that there is a normative aspect to Heidegger’s 
work. Guignon remarks that “Heidegger’s concept of “authenticity’ is supposed to 
point to a way of life that is higher than that of average everydayness.” 125 Similarly, 
Mulhall, thinks that “Heidegger’s words offer themselves as a pivot for their reader’s 
self-transformation”.126 Heidegger’s language, with its “negative characterizations of 
inauthenticity”, does seem to support authenticity and oppose inauthenticity, as 
Carman notes.127 However, since Heidegger explicitly states, in a number of places 
throughout his work, that his task is descriptive rather than normative, we cannot 
agree that his intentions veer toward ethical theory, no matter what impact his 
ontology may have upon its readers.128 
 
Obviously, the development of an ethical theory is best left to the ethicists, and thus 
Heidegger is correct in declining to ascribe value to either authenticity or 
inauthenticity. Seligman, coming from a background in science is also aware that it 
“is not the job of Positive Psychology to tell you that you should be optimistic, or 
spiritual, or kind…it is rather to describe the consequences of these traits”. 129  
However, unlike Heidegger, it seems that Seligman’s intentions must be to guide the 
populace toward a more authentic existence.130 Else, one wonders at the motivation 
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behind his founding contribution to the Positive Psychology movement which “points 
the way toward a secular approach to noble purpose and transcendent meaning”.131 
Guignon argues that with the modern decay of belief systems and close communities, 
“therapists are now asked to serve as moral authorities” “addressing questions about 
what constitutes the good life”.132 It is clear that, despite his protests to the contrary, 
Seligman’s project is precisely this.133 How Seligman’s vision of Positive Psychology 
as a positive science can be reconciled with its concern with the good and meaningful 
life is difficult to say. However, if we accept that, at the ontic level, “moral concerns 
are an inescapable part of any project of understanding humans” then a 
comprehensive ontic science of humanity would necessarily require thought on moral 
theory.134 In this sense, Positive Psychology would be a marked improvement on its 
scientific forebears, which “aimed at being value free and objective” thus missing an 
essential feature of the human person.135 If this reinvigorated ontic science can be 
further enhanced by Heidegger’s ontology, then Positive Psychology has the 
possibility to become an integrated theory of the human person. 
 
Positive Psychology and ‘Authenticity’ in light of Heidegger 
The integration of Heidegger’s ontology into Positive Psychology’s work on 
authenticity does not seem implausible. Seligman argues that when “well-being 
comes from engaging our strengths and virtues, our lives are imbued with 
authenticity.” 136 On the other hand, positive emotion “alienated from the exercise of 
character leads to emptiness, to inauthenticity”.137 Furthermore, Seligman makes the 
point that in this state we more readily succumb to depression and the “gnawing 
realisation that we are fidgeting until we die.” There are recognisable links here to 
Heidegger’s notion of ‘choosing to make the choice’ to live authentically in the face 
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of our own mortality or our ‘Being-toward-death’. 138  In essence, then, both 
approaches acknowledge the importance of taking a resolute stance toward our place 
within the world. 139 Beyond these similarities, Heidegger’s theory can be of benefit 
in demonstrating deficiencies in Positive Psychology’s currently underdeveloped 
theory of authenticity, so that resulting drawbacks may be avoided. 
 
The first way in which Heidegger can support Positive Psychology is by the provision 
of an articulate account of the ontological structure of authenticity. Heidegger uses 
the terms authenticity and inauthenticity as equal descriptors of two possible modes 
of Being-in-the-world. Seligman on the other hand, speaks more of authenticity than 
inauthenticity, most likely in order to right the bias that he sees in the humanities, 
encapsulated in the “belief that happiness (and even more generally, any positive 
human emotion) is inauthentic.”140 He claims to “have taken care to use [his] terms in 
consistent and well-defined ways”. 141  However, even though one of his primary 
works is entitled Authentic Happiness the concept of authenticity and how it 
supplements a comprehensive account of the human person is never fully explicated. 
Admittedly authentic ‘positive feeling’ is described as that which “arises from the 
exercise of strengths and virtues” and that the exercise of a signature strength will 
afford “a sense of ownership and authenticity (“This is the real me”)”. 142 
Authenticity itself is not defined. Similarly, happiness (which, from the title of the 
book one might guess is linked with authenticity) is left undefined  since Seligman 
claims “it is not [his] intention to add to the clutter...” to which the many varied 
definitions of happiness contribute.143 Rather than defining happiness, it is seemingly 
acceptable merely to measure it.  Furthermore, the terms ‘happiness’ and ‘well-being’ 
are used interchangeably and will “sometimes refer to feelings and sometimes refer to 
activities in which nothing is felt.” 144 Such indistinct use of key terms complicates 
the analysis of Seligman’s use of authenticity and its comparison with Heidegger’s 
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complex yet systematic treatment of the concept. Contrast with Heidegger highlights 
Positive Psychology’s need for clarity – a clarity which Heidegger can help provide. 
For example, Heidegger can suggest why respondents using their signature strengths 
report that they feel “it is the real me”. Through use of their ‘signature strengths’, and 
indeed through engagement with the tenets of Positive Psychology, a person takes up 
the challenge of self creation. They have become cognisant of the fact that they exist 
within a particular existentiell reality, a particular set of meanings, and work to create 
their own meaningful existence within those. In short, authenticity comes from the 
awakened relation to one’s Being-in-the-world. 
 
The second way Heidegger can inform Positive Psychology relates to how 
authenticity relates to time. The similarity between the two theories, beyond their use 
of the term authenticity, is that they frame authentic being in relation to time. From 
the forgoing, it is clear that authenticity for Heidegger requires a future orientation. 
For the Positive Psychologist, authentic happiness may seemingly be enhanced by 
“changing how you feel about the past, how you think about the future and how you 
experience the present.”145 It only seems as if ‘authentic happiness’ may be enhanced 
by this means, since, elsewhere, Seligman relates authenticity directly and 
specifically with ‘gratification,’ which is only associated with the present: “happiness 
in the present moment consists of very different states from happiness about the past 
and future, and it embraces …pleasures and gratifications.”146 Seligman discriminates 
here between the past present and future, whereas for Heidegger they are necessarily 
interrelated. So it would seem that there is a difference between Heidegger’s and 
Positive Psychology’s use of authenticity, since for Heidegger authenticity relates to 
the entire temporal structure whereas Seligman captures authenticity in the present. It 
would make more sense if Positive Psychology adopted Heidegger’s stance which 
can nonetheless keep the general thrust of Positive Psychology’s position in tact. For 
Heidegger, authenticity has a future orientation, but that necessarily impacts present 
action (as one creates the imagined future in the present) and is derived from the past 
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(as the present evolves out of past system of meanings experienced in the past). For 
Positive Psychology to cohere with this temporal understanding of authentic self 
creation, all that is required is that gratification is understood as authentic since it 
already has a future orientation (in that it brings about psychological development147) 
and that it is derived from the past (this strength is gratifying within this system of 
meaning, and feels right to me since it is characteristic of what I have been in the 
past). It is evident that this formulation is not far from the general character of 
Seligman’s work – it merely makes the temporal structure of authenticity less 
ambiguous. 
 
Thirdly, Heidegger can improve Positive Psychology’s conception of ‘gratification’ 
by coupling it with ‘resoluteness’. The experience of gratification “consists in total 
engagement and in the loss of self-consciousness.” 148  Such ‘absorption’ or 
‘engagement’ in activities is taken as necessarily positive, and thus as a contributing 
factor toward authenticity. When thus engrossed in using signature strengths one has 
the feeling of being authentic or the “real me”.149  Such an experience is described by 
Csikszentmihalyi as ‘flow.’150 When experiencing flow,  
there is an absence of emotion, [since consciousness] 
and emotion are there to correct your trajectory, when 
what you are doing is seamlessly perfect, you don’t 
need them.151 
 
This is strikingly similar to the way in which Heidegger describes our common 
engagement with the world. However, Heidegger’s nuanced understanding of 
authentic temporality can be used to warn of the dangers of gratification or ‘flow’ 
when not paired with ‘resoluteness’. He argues that absorption in a task is, for the 
most part, a necessary expression of Being, but one which easily succumbs to (and 
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indeed is most often characterised by) inauthenticity. Gratification or the total 
absorption in current goings on may in fact be indicative of inauthenticity rather than 
authenticity. We become lost in activities on daily basis, and are only aware of our 
engagement in such activities when they are interrupted – for example when an object 
‘ready-to-hand’ breaks and is no longer suited to its purpose it becomes ‘present-at-
hand.’ 152  It is only at such times that we glimpse our Being-in-the-world. 153  As 
Seligman notes, “we do not think, we are barely conscious, until something goes 
wrong.” 154  Thus ‘flow’ or gratification alone is not a sufficient criterion for 
authenticity. Only when absorption in the present or ‘enpresenting’ is coupled with 
resoluteness can this engagement realise authenticity. Only present activity driven by 
a resolute forward-looking stance, which recognises one’s ownmost potentiality for 
self creation will allow for authenticity. 
 
So, if Heidegger’s notion of authenticity is integrated into Positive Psychology, it 
clarifies the latter’s use of the term, it corrects the inconsistencies in Positive 
Psychology’s theory of authenticity and time and protects against the unwitting 
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3. Befindlichkeit and Dualism  
Can Positive Psychology’s ‘states of mind’ be reconciled with Heidegger’s 
Befindlichkeit that seeks to overcome the notion of mind/body duality? 
 
From the outset it seems unlikely that there can be any reconciliation between two 
such diverse systems of thought as contained within Psychology (and Positive 
Psychology, its offshoot) and Heidegger’s work. Positive Psychology, as much as it 
seeks to reorientate the tradition’s approach toward mental health care, is, like its 
parent discipline, based on a particular theory of mind which can trace its historical 
pedigree back to 17th Century Dualism. Indeed, Dualism has permeated almost all 
theorising on the nature of the human person to this day, and has become entrenched 
in the common person’s understanding of the nature of the self. One of Heidegger’s 
chief aims is to challenge such “deep-seated presuppositions that give us a distorted 
view of ourselves” that have prevailed in Western philosophical thought.155 Thus he 
is careful not to employ terms which connote any such schism within the individual. 
Rather, he holds that what “is decisive for ontology is to prevent the splitting of the 
phenomenon – in other words to hold its positive phenomenal content secure.”156 
Thus, the Dualism (which implicitly informs Positive Psychology) and the 
phenomenological work of Heidegger are antithetical: the ‘self’ of Dualism “does not 
coincide with Dasein either ontically or ontologically.”157   
 
It will be argued here that although this theoretical gap cannot be bridged, the use of 
Heidegger’s ontology in place of Dualism would give Positive Psychology an explicit 
theoretical founding which is a more accurate reflection of the existence of the human 
person. The theoretical attitude, (which is part and parcel of a Dualist outlook), 
distances Being, and thus disallows the full engagement with the structures of Dasein, 
since Dasein is ‘that entity for which Being is an issue’. In short, Psychology’s aim to 
understand the human person is ultimately thwarted by its methods. Thus Positive 
Psychology would benefit if the total and blinkered reliance on the theoretical attitude 
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as laid to rest and the structure of attunement were kept in the foreground of its ontic 
endeavour. To this end, the following clarifies Heidegger’s concept of Befindlichkeit, 
or attunement, which is inaccurately rendered in the Maquarrie & Robinson’s 
translation of Being and Time as “states of mind”.158 Secondly, the unquestioned 
integration of the Dualist perspective into the theoretical frameworks that Positive 
Psychology utilises is uncovered. Thirdly, Heidegger’s critique of Cartesian Dualism, 
as it relates to the clear vision of the human person is examined, exposing why this 
particular assumption is problematic for the Psychological sciences. It will be 
suggested throughout that the particular problems that Positive Psychology faces as 
an outcome of its Dualist bias can be overcome if Heidegger’s ontology is adopted. 
 
Heidegger’s Concept of Befindlichkeit  
Heidegger “attempts to capture the “concrete totality of man” as agency in everyday 
situations prior to any of the philosophical splits into mind versus body, subject 
verses object, or consciousness versus thing.”159 In this attempt to describe how we 
find ourselves in the world, “Heidegger consistently tries to avoid giving the 
impression that Dasein exists inside a subjective sphere, such as a mind.”160 Thus, 
instead of phrases which might be readily understood to connote ‘mind,’ Heidegger 
employs the neologism Befindlichkeit. When translating Befindlichkeit into English, it 
is difficult to keep the meaning of this word intact since “there is no ideal English 
equivalent”. 161 However, given Heidegger’s opposition to Dualism, “Maquarrie and 
Robinson’s rendition of the word as “state-of-mind” is inappropriate.” 162 Maquarrie 
and Robinson admit as much, saying that although they have chosen to render 
Befindlichkeit as “state-of-mind,” the term is closer in meaning to the phrase “the 
state in which one may be found.”163 Further, they affirm that “‘of mind’ belongs to 
the English idiom, [and it] has no literal counterpart in the structure of the German 
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word, and fails to bring out the important connotation of finding oneself.” 164 
Heidegger scholars have tried to overcome the difficulty in various ways: Polt, for 
example, choses to use Stambaugh’s approximation “attunement,” whereas others 
“have tried “situatedness”, “disposedness”, “affectedness”, “so-foundness”, “attuned 
self finding”, and even “where-you’re-at-ness”” and “disposition.”165 This paper will 
follow Polt’s lead and side with Stambaugh’s “attunement” since it seems to capture 
Heidegger’s meaning best.  
 
Simply, by Befindlichkeit Heidegger means to indicate that which is “the most 
familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood our Being-attuned.”166 Befindlichkeit is 
intimately connected with mood, since it is through these means that “how one is, and 
how one is faring” is made manifest. 167  However, this simplicity given by the 
familiarity of Befindlichkeit, masks a complex structure. Heidegger suggests that, 
unlike the common impression of the structure of ‘mind’, attunement is not “itself an 
inner condition which reaches out… and put its mark on Things.” 168  Instead, 
attunement has two basic features: first, it discloses Being-in-the-world as a whole, 
and second, it reveals the world, our Being-with and our particular mode of existence 
(as Dasein) simultaneously.169  In other words, being attuned reveals the fact that 
Being-in-the-world is an existential condition of our natures while it also reveals the 
particular existentiell worlds we are in, how we relate (or comport ourselves) to them 
and to other people.  Heidegger uses ‘fear’ as a practical example of attunement, in 
order to illustrate how these features are enabled by its tripartite structure; there is (1) 
that in the face of which we fear, (2) fearing, and (3) that about which we fear.170 
(Fear, unlike anxiety, is not central to Heidegger’s overall project but merely a 
convenient vehicle for the description of the structure of attunement. The description 
could easily have been rendered with the aid of other moods. In the case of love for 
example, there is (1) the beloved, (2) loving, and (3) the lover.) It should be noted that 
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fear and anxiety, though related, are constituted differently. We fear some entity 
within the world, whereas we experience anxiety in the face of “Being-in-the-world 
as such.”171 Thus there are two levels of attunement at play – the former ontico-
existentiell, (relating to individual situations) the latter ontological-existential 
(relating to our shared participation in Being).172 
 
Clients attend mental health clinics for assistance with both levels of attunement. 
Although, at first glance, providing assistance in such cases would arise out of the 
‘weakness model’ of Psychology, the treatment of ontological-existential anxiety can 
compliment the aims of Positive Psychology. Once anxiety in the face of “Being-in-
the-world as such” is identified, this can be recognised as the impetus for an authentic 
relation to Being. An authentic relation to Being is thus enabled because anxiety 
“makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – 
that is Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself.”173 This 
example alerts us to the fact that while Positive Psychology is right to seek a balance 
to the one-sided focus of the ‘weakness model,’ if it restricts itself only to the 
enhancement of ‘positive’ mood to the exclusion of the ‘negative’ it becomes equally 
one-sided. The Positive Psychologist, in her eagerness, must not loose sight of the 
fact that people are integrated wholes, whose way of being attuned can be led from 
ontico-existentiell pessimism to optimism, and that ontological-existential anxiety is 
the harbinger of authenticity. In short, she must not neglect the place ‘negative’ 
moods have in the search for the authentic moments within the good life.174 
 
Dualism and Positive Psychology 
Heidegger makes the point that “any science is grounded in a tacit ontology of its 
object domain.” 175 This is true of Positive Psychology, which does not have an 
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explicit, developed ontology which informs its relation to, and theorising on, the 
existential human person. Instead it has taken on an ontology handed down to it along 
with the other natural sciences; namely Dualism. Positive Psychology has developed 
on the back of the general abandonment of Behaviourism within Psychology. The 
principle flaw within Behaviourism is that its Materialist leanings left the ‘inner life’ 
of the subject inaccessible to study by the Psychologist which meant that certain traits 
could not be accounted for (such as optimism and future mindedness, since these did 
not cohere with the model of conditioned-response.) Thus Behaviourism was 
abandoned in preference for models which did not suffer these difficulties. Principle 
among them is Cognitive Theory.176 
 
Heidegger, as a forerunner to Kuhn, held that it is a mark of scientific maturity if a 
discipline can undergo a “crisis in its basic concepts.”177 Over the last half century, 
Psychology has indeed experienced “freshly awakened tendencies to put research on 
new foundations.”178 However, these developments, whilst making the ‘inner life’ 
more accessible to the theorizing of the Psychologist, do not represent as radical a 
shift as the initial assessment reveals. For, these ‘new foundations’ brought with them 
a “new understanding of the human mind”, an approach which merely switched sides 
within the traditional debate – from the Materialist perspective of Behaviourism 
toward the Dualism assumed by Cognitivism.179 So, while these developments are 
encouraging, a more radical reformulation of the beliefs which are prior to the 
Cognitivist foundation of Positive Psychology is still required.  
 
Basically, Dualism rests on the idea that the mind and body are separate: that I am 
somehow ‘in here’ relating to a world that is ‘out there’. Furthermore, the mind and 
body are ontologically distinct – one being the res cogitans, the other the res extensa 
respectively. The mind, or the ego of the self, is defined by thought in opposition to 
the spatial extension of the body. Arguably, this model arose out of the impression of 
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the self one is afforded when reflecting, alone, in a ‘stove heated room.’ 180 
Seventeenth Century thinkers distrusted the accuracy of perception which arose out of 
an embedded engagement with the world, and thus a starting point void of 
presuppositions was sought for the sciences.181 The senses, being easily misled could 
not provide such a certain foundation for the newly emerging scientific enterprise. 
Famously, Descartes set himself the task of providing a solid foundation for the 
sciences and claimed “that he was putting philosophy on a new and firm footing.”182 
 
This ‘firm footing’ required a different relation to the world, a new attitude and thus 
the scientific attitude of ‘objectivity,’ took priority. Scientific objectivity is 
characterised by a disengagement from everyday involvement in the world, a “getting 
free of the perspective of embodied experience.”183 It is in this disembodied attitude 
that the link between the mind and the subject, as opposed to the body and the object, 
becomes clear. These two perspectives work in tandem. This Dualist dichotomy has 
permeated the sciences and seeped into the common conception of what constitutes 
the essential features of human person. It is precisely such ‘common sense’ ideas 
which obscure an honest assessment of our Being-in-the-world, which is why 
Heidegger is so keen to take them to task. His contention is that Psychology’s 
emphasis on, and understanding of, the mind “has originated at the outset from 
epistemological considerations” and thus cannot supply an ontology of the human 
person in total. 184  The assumption of Dualism, rents the human person in two, 
‘splitting the phenomenon’ which inhibits an accurate perception of the human person. 
This perspective therefore necessarily obstructs the main task of the Psychological 
sciences – the development of a clear and comprehensive understanding of the human 
person. So, not only has Positive Psychology, (and psychology generally) failed to 
adopt an explicit ontology, but the one it has implicitly accepted is flawed to the point 
of frustrating its aims.  
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Heidegger and Descartes  
Heidegger’s critique of Cartesian Dualism works on many levels, some of which will 
be outlined here. In brief, the following will include Heidegger’s assertions against 
Descartes that his project was misconceived and that, because of it, Being remains 
unclarified and is even made more distant, that the person was thus removed (in 
theory) from space and from the ‘world,’ and that Descartes inappropriately 
privileged the theoretical attitude, and overemphasised thought as a characteristic of 
human Being. 
 
From the first, Heidegger disagrees with Descartes’ ambition to rid the sciences of all 
presuppositions, recognising that all understanding arises against a background of 
tradition.185 (Alternatively, Heidegger favours a mode of inquiry which lays initial 
assumptions bare and then realigns them with that which is discovered throughout the 
course of investigation. This is the essence of his hermeneutic approach, which is 
cyclical in structure, rather than foundational, since it has a “relatedness backward 
and forward”.186) Further, Heidegger argues that there “is no existential-ontological 
justification for removing the structures of how we relate to the world and reducing 
our selves to a mind attended to something present-at-hand.”187 The imperative to do 
this, to find the certainty with which to assuage finitude, evident throughout the 
history of Western Philosophy, comes from a flight from Being, itself an inauthentic 
mode of existence.188 Thus, in his attempt to keep the phenomenon whole, Heidegger 
will not carry on the debate surrounding whether something exists ‘outside the mind’ 
or not. Rather, he sees his task as pointing out the fundamental inappropriateness of 
the question: 
The question of whether there is a world at all and whether 
its Being can be proved, makes no sense if it is raised by 
Dasein as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it?189 
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The formulation of such a question (the ‘scandal’ of philosophy) is token of the crass 
misinterpretation of the structure of Dasein as divided into internal mind and external 
matter, rather than an integrated whole, whose being is characterised by a Being-in-
the-world.190 The attainment of a presuppositionless foundation for the sciences is 
impossible and demonstrates the fundamental mischaracterisation of Dasein, and 
further the flight from Being. The regrettable outcome of Heidegger’s analysis is that 
no certainty, the likes of which Descartes was seeking, remains – unless it is the far 
better certitude of ‘always already’ Being-in-the-world, which Cartesian Dualism 
removes from us. 191 
 
So, Descartes’ endeavour is misplaced in the first instance. The second mistake 
Descartes makes is to uncritically take over the theories of the Middle Ages which 
take existence, sum or Being as self-evident. 192 Consequently, Descartes “leaves the 
sum undiscussed, even though it is regarded as no less primordial than the cogito.”193 
In other words, within the cogito sum formula, the cogito (thought) is emphasised 
whereas the sum (existence) is ignored. The meaning of the type of Being which 
Descartes employs “remains unclarified because it is held to be self-evident.” 194 
Beyond taking the questions of the Schoolmen for his own without critical evaluation 
(or perhaps because of this), Descartes errs in that he “takes the Being of 
‘Dasein’…in the same way as he takes the Being of res extensa – namely as 
substance.”195 For Descartes, the “ego is a res which shares the realitas of…ready-to 
hand [and the] present-at-hand”.196 Admittedly, Descartes draws a sharp distinction 
between the spatiality of the body, the res corporea, and the non-spatiality of the 
mind, the ego cogito.197 The being of the corporeal substance is defined in terms of 
extension in space, which in turn leads him to define the ‘world’ in terms of spatiality, 
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in opposition to the mind. However, the human person is essentially defined as a 
thinking thing, which for Heidegger is a mischaracterisation: “Dasein is essentially 
not a Being-present-at-hand; and “spatiality” cannot signify anything like the 
occurrence at a position in world space”.198 Descartes’ theory misconstrues Dasein’s 
Being, since it is “conceived as something obvious or ‘self evident’ in the sense of the 
Being-present-at-hand of other created things.” 199 Moreover, in taking the sum as 
self evident, Descartes stands accused of “failing to discuss the meaning of being 
which the idea of substantiality embraces”.200  
 
The mind or ego cogito, is defined as non-physical, and is thus removed from its 
engagement with the physical world (interaction between the two thus becoming a 
problem for the Dualist). The ego is a deficient rendering of the self since it lacks 
spatiality, whereas “Dasein is neither non-extended in the manner of the ego cogito 
nor extended: it is spatial”. 201 The self, in contrast, is conceived of as isolated within 
the capsule of the body. The unfortunate repercussion of this is that it is removed 
from its involvement in the “referential totality” which constitutes the “worldhood-of-
the-world.”202 According to Heidegger, the Being of entities within the world can 
only be encountered on the basis of the phenomena of the ‘world.’ The objective 
attitude adopted by science, implicit in Descartes’ theorising, clouds our pre-
ontological relation to Being, since it does not allow for our relation to the ‘world.’ 
The mind is that which coolly observes the world, not that which is actively engaged 
in it. 
 
This theoretical stance which removes our natural relation to Being is less a difficulty 
for science than it is for Descartes. Generally, ontic inquiry seeks the facts which 
ontic science can supply, so the theoretical attitude is not misplaced. However, the 
objectivity which separates the subject from the object to be examined, and from the 
world in general, conflicts with Descartes’ aim to further ontology. This is because 
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Dasein, in its familiarity with the ‘relational totality’ of the ‘world’ – not abstracted 
from the ‘world’ into the lonely place of the subject, – is the condition in which the 
Being of Dasein is disclosed, allowing for the disclosure of the Being of things-in-
themselves (the ready-to-hand) and finally Being as such. 203 Descartes’ emphasis on 
science, and his adoption of an objective attitude toward ontology, approaches Being 
from an ontic standpoint – a point from which Being can never be encountered.204  By 
separating the self from its system of involvements, Descartes forever closed the door 
to an ontology of Dasein which reveals the nature of Being. 
 
However, as noted, this emphasis on objectivity is not detrimental to the natural 
sciences, and in fact has proven immensely useful – its effects are manifest in the 
massive technological advances which have transformed our world since Descartes’ 
era. The utility of the scientific attitude is in no doubt. However, for Heidegger, the 
scientific attitude is an impoverished relation to the world, for all its utility: 
By looking at the world theoretically, we have already 
dimmed it down to the uniformity of what is purely present 
at hand, though admittedly this uniformity comprises a new 
abundance of things which can be discovered…205 
 
Doubt can and should be raised, then, as to whether this ‘dimmed attitude’ is a 
suitable means to define the human person as such. In itself, the theoretical attitude is 
unproblematic, but the difficulty comes when this attitude is used in the delineation of 
human Being. “The fateful move was…the ontologizing of this perspective, reading it 
into the depth constitution of the mind itself”.206 Thus, since Descartes looks to the 
nature of the human person to clear his doubt and provide a firm foundation for the 
sciences, the method he employed was ill suited to the task. The theoretical or 
objective attitude was the instrument with which Descartes sought human Being, and 
thus he discovered, not Dasein, but the thinking being. Descartes privileges the ego 
cogito rather than the ego sum, defining the human person in light of the ability to 
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think rather than the ability to relate to Being.207 Descartes’ bias toward cognition is 
an inaccurate rendering of the human person since it does not describe the whole 
person, but merely one faculty of the person, and takes this as definitive. Descartes’ 
limiting cogito defines the human person by its capacity for thought, whereas 
Heidegger’s “Da imparts upon everything else nothing less than Sein, being.”208 In 
short, the ego cogito, as the model of human Being, is deficient, and for these various 
reasons Heidegger’s theory is a better reflection of how we actually are. 
  
Some clarification of Heidegger’s position may be useful at this point. The ‘relational 
totality’, which Heidegger identifies as the structure in which Dasein exists and 
encounters Being, is permeated with meaning. But this is not to say that this 
phenomenon is thus dissolved into “pure thinking.”209 Dasein’s embeddedness in the 
world is fundamentally meaningful, but this meaning arises in connection with what 
the human person is involved with daily, what she is ‘along-side,’ that which she 
encounters ‘proximally.’ Furthermore the foregoing discussion should not create the 
impression that Heidegger is against objectivity. Heidegger himself employs 
objectivity, but in the sense of a “willingness to revise one’s point of view in the light 
of what one discovers.”210 
 
Dualism as Problematic for the Psychological Sciences 
For the reasons outlined above, the model of human Being presented by Dualism is 
deficient. If the sciences assume a form of Dualism then they will similarly make the 
gross error of viewing the human person as essentially ‘substance’ capable of 
‘thought.’ The lack of access to Being delivered through an unconscious accord with 
Dualism may not present a problem for the ontic sciences in general, after all, their 
aim is not to uncover the nature of Being. However, it is certainly a problem for those 
ontic sciences which concern themselves with the human person – Psychology and 
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thus Positive Psychology among them. If Dasein is that entity for which ‘Being is an 
issue,’ a science, (which has poor access to the nature of this relation to Being), which 
seeks to understand the human person, will fail at its task. To reiterate earlier 
arguments, ontic investigation provides no means of coming to a theory of the human 
person as such, but can only generalise from data collected on particular 
individuals. 211  The Psychologist adopts a theoretical outlook and thus asks ontic 
questions in the false hope of revealing the nature of the Being who is fundamentally 
ontological. Ontic question cannot provide answers which account for the ontological 
character of Dasein.  Thus it is essential that the assumption Dualism with its adamant 
championing of the theoretical attitude be corrected. 
 
Beyond this central difficulty, the unthinking adoption of Dualism leads to further 
problems for the sciences which take the human person as their subject.  Deiner, 
Lucas and Oishi note that scientists “who study subjective well-being assume that an 
essential ingredient of the good life is that the person herself likes her life. Subjective 
well-being is defined as a person’s cognitive and affective evaluations of his or her 
life.” 212  The predominance of the cognitive ‘introspection’ in the assessment of 
optimal human function is apparent in this rendition of subjective well-being. Whilst 
it is impossible to gain an impression of subjective well-being without causing the 
subject to reflect, such reflection causes the subject to disengage from the world, and 
seek answers ‘within’. This strategy of assessment of the human person is flawed, as 
it removes the subject from the totality of engagements in which she was previously 
immersed. Isolated reflection, a derivative of the theoretical attitude, is an 
impoverished way of apprehending the self, since “Dasein arrives at a theoretical 
attitude only…by a procedure of subtraction.”213 
 
Heidegger argues that attaining “knowledge of the self is not a matter of perceptually 
tracking down and inspecting the point called the “Self”, but rather one of seizing 
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upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world”.214 Once ‘self reflection’ begins, 
the test subject, being influenced by the traditional ontology passed down through 
Western culture, treats herself as an object ‘present-at-hand.’ Thus, she gives a 
satisfactory answer to the mode of question put to her, but this answer fails to capture 
her existential reality, as a person who is engaged in the finite act of self creation 
within a system of meaning.  In this instance it is clear that “the possibilities of 
disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way with the primordial 
disclosure belonging to moods.”215 So the suggestion that attunement be kept in the 
foreground of ontic endeavour is not to recommend an attenuation of the rigour of 
ontic science, or that we should “surrender science ontically to feeling”.216 On the 
contrary, the aim is to correct the view which has led science away from an accurate 
apprehension of the existential reality of Dasein, which in turn clouded 
comprehension of the psychical. For, as Polt explains, moods as “ways of 
experiencing thrownness, disclose the world more fundamentally than any 
propositions, affirmative or negative, that we may express. Our sense of being as a 
whole is what allows us to take up particular relationships to entities, including 
scientific entities.” 217  Harr makes the point in another way, “[b]y pretending to 
deduce totality as objective, (starting, for example, from the principle of reason), 
traditional metaphysics forgets the prerequisite self-giving of the open.”218 
 
Moreover, empirical studies of subjective well-being will not allow for an accurate 
picture of human flourishing because Dasein does not share the same kind of being as 
those objects of science which can be examined from within the theoretical attitude as 
‘present-at-hand’. Ontic inquiry is well suited to the revelation of the particular 
characteristics of substances. Scientists can perform experiments on the ‘present-at-
hand’ to discover how it will change under various conditions. The difficulty comes 
when the person is equated with substance, even if a ‘special kind’ of substance. It is, 
                                                 
214 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 146 
215 Ibid. H p. 134 
216 Ibid. H p. 138 
217 Polt, Heidegger, an Introduction, p. 126 
218 Harr, Michael, ‘Attunement and thinking’, in Critical Heidegger, Christopher MaCann (Ed.), 
Routledge,  London, 1996, p. 162 
   47 
of course commonplace to perform ontic experiments on human subjects. Psychology 
in general has a history of viewing “human beings as passive foci: [for whom] stimuli 
came on and elicited responses”. 219 This bias is persistent. For example, Deiner, 
Lucas and Oishi suggest that the questionable validity of self-report instruments may 
be overcome via the use of a “battery of subjective well-being measures” and “many 
more longitudinal studies”. 220  The inadequacy of ontic inquiry for getting to the 
fundamentals of the nature of the human person and thus the question of human 
flourishing will not be rectified by substituting one experiment for more.  
 
This solution will not suffice since the ‘questionable validity of self-report 
instruments’ comes from their basis in empirical science in the first instance. Such 
experiments are designed to illustrate, repeatedly, what states can be expected under 
certain conditions. If, as in Positive Psychology, happiness is under investigation, and 
this is understood in terms of flourishing, (as Positive Psychology does) then the type 
of being which is ‘under the microscope’ must be established first. In other words, 
these experiments require that the ontology of the human person is laid out for the 
experiments to have any meaningful context. Ontic inquiry cannot ascertain the 
ontological nature of the human person, or Dasein. Scientists may perform 
experiments on human subjects in order to gauge, for instance, “emotional reactions 
to events” but such an approach will only reveal the person in the same way as an 
object is revealed.221 An ontic examination can only reveal facts, but not a clear 
rendition of the existential nature of human being. To inquire into the existential 
reality of a person using ontic modes of inquiry is to make a category mistake, which 
will ultimately doom the project to failure. To investigate the human person in the 
same mode as one would investigate an object is to neglect the essential nature of the 
subject. This is because the nature of Dasein is defined by a primordial relation to 
Being. The investigation of this fundamental relation to Being, which is essential to 
the kind of Being the human person is, is beyond the scope of the ontic sciences.  
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The theoretical attitude creates a proclivity for collecting facts, which again can be 
detrimental to the pursuit of clear understanding of Dasein. As Seligman describes, a 
team of Positive Psychologists took a census of philosophical and theological 
“traditions flung across three thousand years and the entire face of the earth” in order 
to determine what virtues might be consistently reported in the attainment of the good 
life. 222 Polt explains the dangers in this method: this “procedure is simply backwards, 
because the lifeworld is what gives all facts their meaning.” 223  Science “cannot 
reconstruct the lifeworld by taking quantities, scientific facts and piling values on top 
of them.”224 While the process afforded a ‘cross cultural taxonomy’ of virtue, the 
experience of virtue and how it relates to the nature of Dasein was not investigated. 
This approach demonstrates how the phenomenon, (what the attunement that comes 
with the embrace of these virtues means for Dasein and how, in turn, this could 
enhance an authentic relation to Being), is obscured by the modes of objective science. 
Again it is clear that Positive Psychology’s mission is obstructed by its modus 
operandi which is based in the theoretical assumptions it leaves unassessed. 225 
Entrenched in the theoretical attitude, the Positive Psychologist is unable to realize to 
the importance of Being for Dasein. The ontological foundations necessary for this 
realisation remain hidden, even though they are “always ‘there’ already, even when 
that empirical material simply gets collected.”226 
 
On another note, the assumption that self evaluation is a sufficient means to provide a 
definition of the good life is questionable, since the “uncertain validity of self-report 
instruments” is recognised as a “major concern” within the field.227 The person who 
meanders aimlessly through life following the whims of popular culture or ‘the They’ 
without giving the import of their own Being any consideration, would likely report 
that they feel happy. Such happiness, however, would merely be the numb lack of the 
depth of passion which a life lived authentically entails. This subjective report of 
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what is in fact inauthentic ‘well-being’ cannot be held to be symptomatic of the good 
life. This is not to say that angst or anxiety must be the ‘basic mood’ which 
constitutes the good life. Seligman is rightly suspicious of the general “unspoken 
assumption in the social sciences that negative traits are authentic and positive traits 
are derivative.”228 However, this bleak outlook does make room for positive emotion, 
as noted earlier.229 Casting anxiety as the predominant mood certainly does not seem 
a jubilant perspective but as anxiety is the response to our Being-toward-death and 
our recognition of our relation to Being, it motivates us toward an authentic life, in 
which genuine well-being and authenticity can be realised. 
 
All of the above problems may be overcome if ontic investigation is grounded in the 
ontological structure of Dasein. That is, what constitutes the good life can only be 
discovered in relation to the Being for which it is the good life. The nature of Dasein 
must be kept in the foreground. This is because, (to follow Aristotle’s formula), the 
good life, eudaimonia, or personal flourishing can only be defined with regard to the 
kind of being it is which flourishes.230 This will then clarify the conditions under 
which that particular kind of being flourishes. To take an arbitrary example, the house 
cat requires a different range of conditions in order to flourish than does the leopard. 
The assessment of what makes these two creatures flourish, or experience the good 
life, qua cat can only be defined in light of the specifics of their Being. Every 
particular type of creature needs a certain set of conditions to flourish – even within 
the cat family, the differences are marked. This difference is amplified once we cross 
species in order to consider what constitutes the good life for the human person. Since 
Dasein is that entity for which ‘Being is an issue’, only a life in which the primacy of 
the individual’s relation to Being is realised, can be understood as the good life. The 
good life is not defined by enduring authenticity but by the quest for those moments 
of authenticity which require a conscious acknowledgement of the human relation to 
Being. 
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If Positive Psychologists are to take advantage of this new approach to unveiling the 
human person set in an explicit Heideggerian ontology, it will require a reformulation 
of their investigation of the human person, one which keeps structure of Dasin’s 
relation to Being in view. It is possible for Positive Psychology to reorientate itself 
away from the detrimental assumptions held within Dualist perspective toward the 
theory which keeps the phenomenal content of human being secure. This will require 
recognition of Positive Psychology’s unnamed reliance on Dualism and its acceptance 
if this associated conception of the person as a ‘thinking substance.’ Then this 
assumption may be set aside so that Positive Psychologists can investigate the human 
person as attuned to the world in which she finds herself. The notion of attunement 
opens up research into how we engage with our particular reality as well as how we 
experience our ontological caste. The human being is always attuned to the world and 
this reveals her Being-in-the-world as an ontological reality. Any Psychology which 
does not understand this is unable to account for this aspect of human experience, and 
is thus deficient. 
 
Thankfully, although Positive Psychology is committed to adapting “what is best in 
the scientific method to the unique problems that human behaviour presents”, there 
already seems to be some inclination toward a Heideggerian model. 231 First, all the 
various connections found between the two paradigms above support this contention. 
Second, Maloney, who contributed to The Handbook of Positive Psychology, 
recognises this ever so subtle shift away from traditional ontology.232 He frames his 
discussion in relation to constructivism rather than Heidegger, however, the language 
he uses is decidedly Heideggerian. Although constructivism is vastly reductionist in 
comparison to Heidegger, given that it defines the “activity of the organism [as] his or 
her primary means of expressing attempts to adapt to prevailing circumstances”, the 
two positions, at least as rendered by Maloney, are strikingly similar.233 For example, 
he describes ‘self-organising processes’ as those in which “we actively “project” our 
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past onto our future. In the process of such anticipatory projection, we shape the 
present moment.”234 In the same chapter, he draws on Kelly to illustrate what this 
understanding of the human person would mean in practical terms for a Psychologist: 
“the role of the therapist is to skilfully challenge the client’s ways of construing the 
self, others, the world, and their possible relationships.” 235 Further, as mentioned 
above, the therapist with an appreciation of Dasein’s relation to Being, will more 
likely be able to assist their client in the movement toward authenticity. The client’s 
particular ontic experience must be seen in the light of the ontological nature of which 
she is an exemplar. In other words, engagement with a particular client can ‘reach 
back’ “to the realm of an ontology of Da-sein.”236  
 
To extrapolate from this, experimental design which takes Heidegger’s rendering of 
Dasein into account may seek to ascertain how the process of self creation with in a 
context is realised, or how the subject is attuned to the world in which she finds 
herself. Such investigation can still make use of the scientific method, but without the 
bifurcation of Dasein into mind and body. Keeping the theoretical attitude in check 
and attunement in the foreground would mean that, rather than affording a theory of 
the human person as ‘subject of experimental design’ Positive Psychology would 
investigate the human person as she is in the world. Thus Positive Psychology would 
not fall victim to the diminution of the appreciation of the human reality as 
Psychology has, but would become a psychology of the fullness of human experience. 
 
Snyder and Lopez note that ‘what Positive Psychology seeks is …recognition as a 
viable, new paradigm – a rigorous science on the positive side of what it means to be 
human.’237 If this is to be achieved, the theory of ‘what it means to be human’ must 
be recognized as beyond the scope of ontic science and thus beyond Positive 
Psychology. The fullness of ‘what it means to be human’ needs supplementation from 
ontological science. Such supplement can only come from within philosophy, and the 
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best candidate to provide this is Heidegger, since he addresses the very issues from 
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4. Emotion and Mood 
How does Positive Psychology’s view of ‘emotion’ compare with that proffered by 
phenomenological analysis such as Heidegger’s ‘moods’? 
 
The interrelationship between attunement (Befindlichkeit) and mood (Stimmung) 
means that the following comparison of Heidegger’s concept of mood and Positive 
Psychology’s concept of emotion is, in part, a continuation of themes of the foregoing 
section. Some work has already been done to reveal the basic structure of attunement 
and mood, and this will be extended in the following.  In addition, the nature of 
emotion, as Positive Psychology uses the term, is explored. This requires a fairly 
extensive critique of the way Seligman, in particular, uses language in the description 
of emotion and its relation to past, future, and present. Although the two terms can be 
used interchangeably in common parlance, there are differences between what 
Heidegger takes for mood, and what Positive Psychology takes for emotion. These 
differences make it seem unlikely that an argument for a structural relationship 
between Heidegger’s notion of mood and Positive Psychology’s emotion can be made. 
However, that the two positions can interrelate in a constructive way is precisely the 
argument advanced here. If Positive Psychology’s emotion can be understood in light 
of Heidegger’s concept of mood, a theoretical relation can be forged between emotion 
and Being. This in turn has potential to embed Positive Psychology’s theory of the 
human person in a theory of Dasein, that entity which has essential relation to Being. 
Psychology and Emotion 
Historically, the dominant views on the human person with in Psychology have 
shifted, which has meant that it has not always embraced the concept of emotion.238 
Psychology has never been anchored to an explicit ontological framework, which has 
meant that theoretical perspectives on the nature of the human person were left to 
drift with the flow of fashion within clinical research circles. (This in itself provides a 
firm reason for the adoption of an explicit ontology by Psychology, even if it is not an 
argument in favour of Heidegger per se. However, an ontology which places the 
nature of the human person in the foreground is an obvious choice.) The changes in 
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how Psychology has conceived of the human person over time have had 
repercussions on how emotion has been characterised, and even on whether the 
concept of emotion was included in the model of psychological processes. 239 
 
Seligman provides a brief but serviceable account of this evolution of thought. He 
recalls, “[w]hen I was a graduate student in Psychology …people were assumed to be 
a product of their environment… “pushed” by their internal drives or “pulled” by 
external events” 240 During the 1960’s this thesis was disputed on a number of fronts, 
most notably ranging from Chomsky’s critique of Skinner, the formulation of 
techniques for studying Developmental Psychology by Piaget, and the emergence of 
the field of Cognitive Psychology.241 All these, in their various guises, contended that 
“self direction”, rather than internal drives or external forces were a preferred 
descriptor of human action, and thus represented the challenge to Behaviourism.242 
Seligman was not left unaffected by these changes, and saw them reflected in his own 
research on learned helplessness which convinced him that “the behaviourist program 
was dead wrong”. 243 In the main, Behaviourism could not adequately account for the 
‘future mindedness’ or expectation which seemed to be at work in experiments on 
learned helplessness, and neglected the cognitive aspects of complex behaviour. 244 
According to Seligman, as an antidote to these failings, “cognitive therapy works.”245 
Possible Difficulties with Enhancing Positive Emotion  
Positive Psychology, remember, finds its impetus in opposition to the prevailing 
culture within Psychology which maintains an “exclusive emphasis on discovering 
deficits and repairing damage.”246 The ideal life, or one which is authentically happy, 
takes advantage of the higher reaches of each person’s ‘set range’ of happiness.247 To 
achieve this, Positive Psychology recommends ‘positive emotion’, and the diminution 
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of ‘negative emotion.’ Emotions are judged as either positive or negative on 
pragmatic grounds: for example, optimism is correlated with better social integration, 
achievement at school work and on the playing field, greater immunity to infectious 
disease, better health habits and longer life.248 Negative traits or emotions, on the 
other hand, are not correlated with the long, healthy happy life that the Positive 
Psychologist seeks to promote. Whilst the drive to improve people’s lives in this way 
is admirable, it brings with it three possible difficulties. 
 
First, the achievement of the higher reaches of one’s ‘set range’ of happiness may 
come at the expense of authenticity. The positive self assessments which provide for 
correlation between happiness and longevity (etc.) may accurately reflect an avid 
engagement with the ‘surface’ activities of life - fulfilment in work, love, family life. 
These are admittedly worthy goals; however, one must ask whether they are 
indicative of ‘authenticity’ or if they are only an egoic definition of flourishing which 
is in fact constrained by ‘the They.’ This version of optimal functioning can exist 
alongside the negation of Being. A long life lived superficially, without reflection on 
the kinds of beings we are and without resolute engagement with Being cannot be 
viewed as positive. It is a half life. Thus Positive Psychology may furnish the world 
with objectively happy, resilient, optimistic individuals who nevertheless never 
acquire the attunement which allows engagement with Being, finitude and 
authenticity. We can be optimistically inauthentic. The definition of authentic 
flourishing must be derived from the nature of Dasein, not the immune system or 
longevity. The accuracy of Positive Psychology’s ontic definition of flourishing must 
be measured against an ontological understanding of the human person. 
 
Secondly, in its attempts to correct the imbalance within Psychology at large, Positive 
Psychology may overstep the mark and understate the place of negative emotion in 
the spectrum of human development. Both Psychology and Positive Psychology seem 
to shy away from the negative emotions; the first because it will rid us of them, the 
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second because it urges us to strive toward the positive. What is experienced as 
negative, whilst unpleasant, may nonetheless be valuable, and thus positive. Anxiety 
is unpleasant, (sometimes in the extreme) but not negative, for “anxiety reveals 
Dasein as the being who, holding itself out into the nothing, is always already beyond 
beings, confronting being as a whole in the very withdrawal of beings.” 249 
Heidegger’s idea of anxiety is particular: it is a form of attunement and cannot be 
reduced to a trait, or emotion. But the ‘burden of anxiety’ need not be judged as 
wholly negative, since it is this burden which brings Dasein closest to itself: “Dasein 
as an “actual burden” is a never ending task and demand. It is in this very decision for 
existence – “resoluteness” – that Dasein is first opened to its ownmost possibilities of 
thought and action, that it becomes free for its own freedom.”250 Admittedly, Positive 
Psychology does note the place of negative mood, to a degree, since we should fit our 
mood to the task at hand, (for example filling out a tax return is complimented by a 
sombre mood). 251 However, negative mood is limited to such specific tasks, and 
isolated from the sometimes deeply felt and pervasive dark moods that often 
accompany and signal psychological growth.  
 
The third difficulty calls once more for a developed ontology.  It is clear that, despite 
Seligman’s protestations to the contrary, Positive Psychology goes beyond the 
descriptive realm of the ontic sciences into the prescription of action and attitude.252 
Positive Psychology recommends certain dispositions, virtues and practices as the 
best means to attaining ‘the good life’. Such recommendations, in so far as they serve 
to answer the question “how should we live” fall within the domain of ethics. As 
mentioned previously, this in itself may represent an improvement, since a 
comprehensive study of the human person cannot neglect human interaction, and thus 
morality becomes relevant.  An ethical theory which is not grounded in a developed 
and accurate ontology is, at best, likely to be inexact, and at worst meaningless, and 
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subject to the cycles of moral fashion. This argument takes for granted that the telos 
of an entity (to flourish or lead the good life) cannot be gauged if there is no 
appreciation of the kind of being whose telos is in question. The telos of a particular 
being is necessarily linked with the nature of that particular kind of being.  The telos 
of the human person is distinct from that of the bonobo, the octopus, the mushroom or 
even Aristotle’s famous knife.  If the purpose of the human person is to flourish qua 
human person, then this requires sets of conditions and excellences which derive from 
the nature of the human person. Similarly, if the knife is to fulfil its telos, it must exist 
under certain conditions and embody the excellences which derive from the nature of 
knives.  
 
If an ethical theory without a definite ontology affords the good life, then this is 
merely by chance. Positive Psychology is able to correlate positive emotion with 
longer, healthier and happier lives. This in itself makes the enterprise worthy of 
support. However, the reasons justifying these beliefs, beyond correlation, are absent. 
For Positive Psychology to be assured of success in its task, the element of luck must 
be removed, and instead the discipline must be grounded in an accurate ontology. 
Since Positive Psychology draws on an Aristotelian view of the human person in a 
cursory way, it would seem that, from within the Western canon, a form of 
Aristotelian ontology would be a likely candidate to supply an explicit metaphysical 
support for Positive Psychology. However, it is precisely the use of Aristotelian 
thought within Positive Psychology which excludes it as a means of critique. For, the 
phenomenologist would argue, it is such pervasive beliefs about the human person 
which should be ‘bracketed’ if real knowledge is to come to light.  
 
Positive Psychology and the Definition of Emotion 
The merit of developments within Psychology aside, it is clear that Positive 
Psychology has evolved out of a Cognitive Theory of mind which, according to 
Seligman, holds that all “emotions have a feeling component, a sensory component, a 
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thinking component and an action component.”253 Seligman does not go far beyond 
this definition, claiming that it is “so uncontroversial… as to be boring.”254 To a 
degree, we can treat this omission charitably, since the text in question, Authentic 
Happiness, is not designed as a means of expounding the philosophical attributes of 
emotion, but as an introduction to the central tenets of Positive Psychology for the 
uninitiated. However, such an omission is unusual since Seligman’s “most basic 
concern…is measuring happiness’s constituents – the positive emotions and 
strengths”.255 Since  
Positive Psychology has three pillars: First is the 
study of positive emotions. Second is the study of the 
positive traits, foremost among them the strengths and 
virtues256 
it would be reasonable to expect a more detailed account of this ‘first pillar.’  This 
lack of detail in definition creates some befuddlement concerning the precise nature 
of these related, yet distinct, terms.  
 
Though undefined, emotion, particularly positive emotion, nonetheless plays an 
important part in Positive Psychology. Seligman explains Frederickson’s research 
into positive emotion, and her claim that “positive emotions have a grand purpose in 
evolution” with great enthusiasm exclaiming, “This is life-changing!” 257 This ‘grand 
purpose’ is afforded by their capacity to “transform” people into “more creative, 
knowledgeable, resilient, socially integrated and healthy individuals.”258 Not only do 
positive emotions “signal optimal functioning” but they also “produce optimal 
functioning, not just within the present moment, but over the long term as well.” 259 
Feeling “positive emotion is important not just because it is pleasant in its own right 
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but because it causes much better commerce with the world.”260  So, the key to 
greater happiness overall is to “move your emotions in a positive direction”.261 
 
Moving ‘emotions in a positive direction’ requires that emotions concerning the past, 
present and future are augmented. For example, contentment with the past “can be 
increased by gratitude” and hope for “the future can be increased by … [disputing] 
automatic pessimistic thoughts.” 262 Strangely, rather than remaining central to the 
development of “authentic happiness” as one might assume, positive emotion in the 
present is of less importance. Positive Psychology advises that the individual should 
“tone down the pursuit of pleasure”, in preference for gratification. This means 
limiting positive emotion since “pleasures are about the senses and the emotions.” 263 
To ‘tone down’ the pursuit of pleasure then, is also to ‘tone down’ the experience of 
positive emotion. Positive emotion is similarly demoted when characterised as a by-
product of utilising a strength which “usually produces authentic positive emotion in 
the doer.” 264 It is the strength that should be valued as a means to gaining fulfilment 
and wellbeing, rather than the emotional ‘side effect’. These recommendations do not 
sit well with the idea that positive emotions have a ‘grand purpose’ in ‘transforming 
lives’. In short, Seligman’s development of the place of the emotions in his 
framework stands in opposition to Frederickson’s thesis (mentioned above), which he 
applauds.  
This ‘toning down’ of positive emotion is recommended in relation to the attainment 
of ‘authentic happiness’ in the present. Happiness in the present “embraces two very 
distinct kinds of things: pleasures and gratifications.”265 The pleasures, as mentioned 
above, are associated with the sensuous “raw feel” and the emotions whereas in the 
case of gratifications “emotions are completely absent.”266 It is the “total absorption, 
the suspension of consciousness, and the flow gratifications produce” which sets them 
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apart from the pleasures, and emotion.267 ‘Flow’ is a technical term for the positive 
Psychologist, indicating “the state of gratification that we enter when we feel 
completely engaged in what we are doing.” 268  Here the use of ‘feel’ might be 
misleading, if we take it to be indicative of emotion. The text sometimes uses 
‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’ interchangeably.  It is generally made clear that “it is the 
absence of emotion, of any kind of consciousness that is the heart of flow.” 269 
However, compare these descriptions to the following: “Flow, you will remember, is 
a positive emotion about the present with no conscious thought or feeling 
attached.”270 So, from this, flow could be described as an emotion with no emotion – 
evidently not what the author intends. Further, compare: “[p]ositive emotion about 
the present divides into …pleasures and gratifications”271 with the “good life… is not 
about maximizing positive emotion, [but in] successfully using your signature 
strengths to obtain abundant and authentic gratification.”272 Here, gratification is a 
class of positive emotion, yet in seeking gratification one should not emphasise 
positive emotion. Such careless use of language may easily engender confusion. 
 
The conflation of terms and the difficulty it brings is demonstrated further in the 
description of optimism.  Seligman initially classes optimism as a ‘trait,’ which is an 
“abiding disposition” and this is contrasted with feelings, which are “states, [or] 
momentary occurrences”.273 A “strength is a trait” so optimism is seen as “one of two 
dozen strengths.”274 Later, Seligman claims that “[p]ositive emotions about the future 
include faith, trust, confidence, hope and optimism” which presents a difficulty if 
“engaging in a strength usually produces authentic positive emotion”.275 In one sense 
optimism is likened to the “squirt of felt positive emotion” which accompanies the 
exercise of a strength, and then in another sense as a strength in its own right. Perhaps 
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optimism can be both a strength and an emotion. However, it seems that they should 
be treated separately because rather than being synonymous with each other, strengths 
and emotions are causally related to each other: deep “emotional satisfaction comes 
from building and using the signature strengths.”276 Emotion cannot be a strength if it 
is produced by strength. Perhaps we may also treat this apparent confusion charitably. 
Emotion must inevitably be treated differently throughout the text, as diverse spheres 
of experience are covered. It is to be expected that the (seemingly consistent) nature 
of emotion would alter in the context of the past, present, or future. But the extent to 
which charity should be extended must be limited. It is a “mark of the trained mind 
never to expect more precision in the treatment of any subject than the nature of that 
subject permits” but also to demand more precision when it is lacking. 277 
 
This careless use of language is exasperating, to say the least, but it also allows for 
conceptual difficulties. One must look carefully to decipher the relation between 
emotion, trait, virtue, strength and happiness. Peterson recognises this as an 
impediment to the development of “Positive Psychology as a whole [which] would be 
benefited – indeed shaped and transformed – by agreed-upon ways for speaking about 
the positive”. 278 He set to correcting this problem by devising a classification of 
human strengths and virtues, to act as the companion text to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American Psychological 
Association. 279 While this document does not employ the term ‘emotion’ it at least 
clarifies the use of virtue, strength and trait. “Character strengths are the 
psychological ingredients – processes or mechanisms- that …are distinguishable 
routes to displaying one or another of the virtues.” 280 Strengths are taken as the 
‘natural category’ which “encompasses a group of related traits.” 281   Thus, a 
hierarchy emerges: traits are the subdivision of strengths which lead to virtues. 
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To illustrate with the example of ‘transcendence,’ one of the six primary virtues listed: 
‘transcendence’ is the virtue given by “strengths that forge connections to the larger 
universe and provide meaning”.282 One of these strengths is hope “expecting the best 
in the future and working to achieve it”.283 In turn, hope is sub-divided once more 
into the traits “optimism, future mindedness and future orientation”.284 This relation 
can be diagrammed thus: 
 
Figure 1:  Virtue, strength and trait 
 
To link this to Seligman’s treatment of emotion, it seems that if strength is the 
‘natural category’ of traits, and strengths are psychological processes, then emotion 
can be taken as an example of a trait, and thus as an example of a strength.  
A More Thorough Definition 
Even though this schema has made the place of emotion somewhat less vague, it is 
worthwhile sourcing a clarification of a Cognitive Theory of emotion elsewhere. 
Solomon, who has been labelled as “cognitivist” (although he wears the term with 
some discomfort as it is an overly simplistic account of his position), can supply some 
of the theoretical clarity which is absent from Seligman’s text. 285  Further, with 
Solomon’s assistance, some of the charges against a cognitivist account of emotion 
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can be met, and (via Solomon’s existentialist leanings) the first glimmer of a meeting 
between Positive Psychology and Heidegger’s conception of these phenomena can be 
seen. 286  As Cognitive Psychology has gained authority, a “cognitive theory of 
emotions” has “become the touchstone of all philosophical theorising about emotion, 
for or against.”287 Even so, it is “not a happy term” since on the one hand, it leads to 
the false assumption that emotions are to be taken as aspects of the intellect, and on 
the other hand, it neglects the element of emotion as active engagement with the 
world.288 Solomon notes that the term ‘emotion’ encapsulates a “fascinating variety 
of phenomena”. 289  They can take the form of brief “interruptive reactions” or 
“substantial processes that last a long time”; they are necessarily experiences which 
“span conscious and nonconscious awareness”; and they can be either involuntary or 
“at least sometimes, “chosen” and voluntary.”290  This complex structure goes some 
way to explaining the descriptive difficulties which taint Seligman’s work.  
 
Beyond these varied characteristics, Cognitive Psychology holds that emotions are 
also ‘evaluative judgements’, in the sense that they are “a way of cognitively 
grappling with the world.”291  (That ‘emotions are judgements’ transcends debate 
between the primitivist and the cognitivist as to whether emotion precedes and drives 
cognition, or whether cognition precedes and drives emotion.292 This, in turn, could 
explain the cause of recent research findings on cognition and emotion which 
demonstrate that “each drives the other at times.”293) More importantly for this thesis, 
all of the above characteristics, combined, form a view that “emotions are subjective 
engagements in the world” – not merely in the sense that they are “about (or “directed 
to”) the world but [are] actively entangled in it.”294 Thus, Solomon’s formulation, 
reproduced here in brief, demonstrates that a Cognitive Theory of mind, such as 
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found in Positive Psychology, can transcend ‘mind’ in its treatment of emotion and 
remain internally consistent.295 
Heidegger’s Concept of Mood (Stimmung) 
The previous chapter noted the close relationship between attunement (Befindlichkeit) 
and mood (Stimmung). It is a useful distinction to think of mood as the ontic 
counterpart to ontological attunement since what Heidegger indicates “ontologically 
by the term state-of-mind [attunement] is ontically the most familiar and every day 
sort of thing; our mood…” 296 For as attuned, Dasein finds itself “in the mood that it 
has”. In this case, people are not the progenitors of mood, but will find themselves in 
some mood. This ‘finding’ works on two levels – first, a person ‘finds herself’ in a 
mood in so far as it is part-and-parcel of Being-in-the-world. Second, a person ‘finds 
herself’ in so far as the particular mood reveals something about the ontic facts of her 
existence.297 Mood is the colouring of the everyday concern with which Dasein is 
involved with the world. The ways “we slip over from one [mood] to another, or slip 
off into bad moods” is an experience to which every person can relate. Dasein is 
‘always already’ disclosed as Being-in-the-world through mood. 298  Mood shows 
Dasein as ‘always’ in the world since there is no point in a person’s life when she is 
without mood. Even the seemingly lifeless mood of ‘catatonic’ boredom is in fact a 
way of Being-in-the-world: the “pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood is far from 
nothing at all.”299 Mood shows Dasein as ‘already’ in the world since Dasein finds 
herself thrown into existence, and facticity elicits mood. As Held describes it, 
“thrownness in the “having-to-project-itself” manifests itself in the moods which tell 
Dasein how it fares with respect to its factical situatedness in the open range of 
possibilities, or “world””300  or more simply, “mood is the response to the call of 
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Being.”301 In her factical situatedness, Dasein usually flees from the possibility of a 
confrontation with Being which the mood presents. This flight in itself provides 
evidence for that from which Dasein flees, so “even in that to which mood pays no 
attention, Dasein is unveiled in its Being-delivered-over-to the “there”.302 
 
Mood is referred to in the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, as Grund-stimmung 
the “fundamental or grounding attunement.”  Here, this fundamental mood “reveals 
Dasein as the entity who is open to Being, and it is in this mode of attunement that the 
basis of metaphysics unfolds.” 303  It also reveals the historical nature of the 
relationship to Being, in the sense that Dasein’s comportment toward being changes 
over time- from the awe or wonderment of ancient Greek minds, to the boredom of 
the current technological age. Held argues that deep “boredom is a fundamental 
temperament like anxiety; the difference is that, from now on, the expression 
“fundamental mood” replaces the concept of fundamental temperament 
[attunement].” 304 However, given Heidegger’s usual exacting use of language, it 
would be surprising if he would so easily slip from the use of Befindlichkeit  into 
Grund-stimmung.  There must be some cause for this shift in language. One 
possibility is that where the attention of Being and Time is devoted to Dasein, and 
how Dasein is the ‘opening’ via which Being is revealed, this later work turns its 
attention to Being and how it ‘reaches toward’ Dasein. 305   So these, admittedly 
related terms, actually denote a difference in orientation: a difference in the 
movement of Dasein toward Being (Befindlichkeit), or of Being toward Dasein 
(Grund-stimmung). It is interesting to note the root of the German word for mood in 
this connection. ‘Stimmung,’ or mood, has its base in ‘stimme’ which is equivalent to 
‘voice’.306 Thus, at the heart of moods is the ‘voice of Being’ which calls Dasein into 
resolute relation- it is the call to authenticity. 307 
 
                                                 
301 Held, ‘Fundamental Moods in Heidegger’s Critique of Contemporary Culture,’  pp. 288, 289 
302 Heidegger, Being and Time, H p. 135 
303 de Beistegui, Thinking with Heidegger, p. 67 
304 Held, ‘Fundamental Moods in Heidegger’s Critique of Contemporary Culture,’ p. 290 
305 I am indebted to Dr. Angus Brook for this insight. 
306 Harr, ‘Attunement and thinking,’ p. 160 
307 Ibid. 
   66 
Of course, in “Being and Time itself, the historical referentiality of moods [such as 
exhibited in the Grund-stimmung of boredom] does not yet emerge.” 308   The 
discussion of Grund-stimmung will be kept to a minimum here, in order not to stray 
too far from Being and Time as a primary text, and in order to restrict the discussion 
of mood to the individual context which coheres better with Positive Psychology. 
However, the fundamental-mood (Grund-stimmung) is noteworthy as a means to 
highlight a possible flaw in Positive Psychology’s enterprise. The fundamental-mood 
of “profound boredom is only one attunement among others, one point of entry into 
the domain of metaphysics.”309 Heidegger identifies boredom as fundamental-mood 
of the current era.310 This boredom is the outcome of the theoretical attitude, which 
has enabled the technological age. Society has the feeling that all questions can be 
answered, and thus the awe with which Dasein approached being two thousand years 
ago is overcome by a “universal smug contentment in not being endangered”.311  In 
the technological attitude, there is no longer any desire to grapple with the mystery of 
Being: “[w]e concern ourselves only with learned competencies that can be 
instilled.”312 These ‘learned competencies’ seem familiar as the optimistic attitude, 
the employment of the strengths and the manipulation of explanatory style: what 
Positive Psychology recommends as the means to authenticity. The technological 
attitude disallows full engagement with Being, and the full realisation of Dasein’s 
nature, since it promotes the ‘smug contentment’ of boredom, and the false idea that 
authenticity is a matter of accruing a selection of ‘learned competencies.’ 
 
Heidegger’s Mood and Positive Psychology’s Emotion  
The central difference between Heidegger’s concept of mood and Positive 
Psychology’s concept of emotion is that Heidegger emphasises Being through linking 
mood with attunement and Being-in-the-world. Psychology’s emotion does not take 
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note of this relation to Being. For Heidegger, mood is the ontic expression of the 
ontological condition of attunement. As attuned in a certain way, “Dasein is always 
brought before itself…in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has.”313  Held 
argues that that emotion is the response to “the day to day tribulations of facticity, 
whereas mood is the response to the call of Being”.314 However, since Heidegger 
characterises mood as “that which makes it possible to direct one’s-self toward 
something”, and does not use the term ‘emotion’, it is probably better to think of 
mood as both caught up in ‘day to day tribulations’ and the ‘response to the call of 
Being’.315  For the call of Being cannot be found outside day to day tribulations. Such 
engagements are what make up our Being-in-the-world. The call of Being is ever 
present. The manner of response may, of course, be either authentic (as in taking on a 
resolute Being-toward-death) or inauthentic (as in a flight into ‘the They’). 
 
Beyond this primary difference between the two theories, Heidegger’s conception of 
mood and Positive Psychology’s conception of emotion resonate well with each other.  
Both maintain that the person is always subject to mood, and that one mood is merely 
changed for another. Heidegger claims that the “Dasein is always in some mood,” and 
she will “slip over from one [mood] to another”. 316  For Seligman, one mood is 
replaced by another: “positive emotions undo negative emotions” and “positive mood 
jolts us into an entirely different way of thinking from a negative mood.”317 Moreover, 
Heidegger’s ‘mood’ shares the involuntary and “sometimes, “chosen” and voluntary” 
aspect of emotions to which Solomon alludes.  Mood “assails us,” yet we can be the 
“master of our moods.”318 
 
Becoming the master of one’s mood requires “knowledge and will” so it is an “act of 
volition and cognition”.319 This is similar to the ‘learned competencies’ of Positive 
Psychology, but with an essential difference. The learned competencies with which 
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Positive Psychology shapes mood are blind to Dasein’s relation to Being, whereas the 
“knowledge and will” Heidegger imagines makes Dasein resolute is its relation to 
Being. It requires that Dasein discover its own possibilities for the creation of life, or 
its ownmost-Being-toward-death. In other words, the ‘mastery of mood’ does not 
coincide with authenticity, but prepares the way for an authentic relation to Being. So 
happiness, or optimism can be the means through which Being may conceivably be 
revealed, but they are not themselves exemplars of an authentic relation to Being. So, 
for Heidegger, the term ‘authentic happiness’ would denote that positive mood which 
would allow for a relation to Being. In effect, happiness, or moods generally, can be 
viewed as a means to an end, where the end is Being. More accurately, mood is the 
‘disclosure’ by which “Dasein is brought before the “that it is” of it’s as “there.””320 
Of course, happiness would probably not be the kind of mood which would lead to an 
encounter with Being, (for a “mood of elation” can alleviate the burden of Being 
inherent in Dasein), but it is not impossible.321 
 
A word of caution: for all these similarities, one should not be quick to reduce mood 
to emotion, since all “mood, even individual, escapes reduction to subjective 
sentiment.”322  For being distracted by “what Dasein is acquainted with, knows, and 
believes at the same time’” as having a mood would “wholly fail to recognise both 
what mood discloses and how it discloses”.323 Whilst both emotion and mood are 
caught up in the facticity of life, mood has the added dimension of its relation with 
Being, in ways which emotions do not. Rather than reducing mood to emotion, a 
theory of emotion can be enhanced by connection with mood. The relation which can 
be forged between mood and emotion is then one where, as one moves toward mood 
beyond emotion, one also moves from the ontic toward the ontological. A connection 
with mood provides emotion a connection with Being and thus has potential to 
complete Positive Psychology’s theory of the human person – that entity which is 
always in relation with Being. Schematically, this relationship is represented below: 
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Figure 2: The  relation  between mood and emotion 
 
 
This schema underscores the way in which Heidegger’s ontology can extend and 
enhance the ontic investigations of Positive Psychology. It is natural that ontic 
science should concern itself with measurable traits, but it is desirable that the results 
from these investigations be set within the context of the prior ontological givenness 
of what is being investigated. In this case, Positive Psychology’s emotion would work 
in parallel with Heidegger’s mood. Once the former succeeds in clarifying the exact 
nature of emotion and its connection to strength and virtue, the relation between the 
two paradigms could be deepened. There is potential, particularly via the virtue of 
transcendence, for a conceptual bridge between emotion and Being to form. 
Remember that transcendence encapsulates those strengths which “forge connections 
to the larger universe and provide meaning”. 324  This creation of connection and 
meaning could be profitably aligned with and enhanced by an appreciation of 
Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, which is ‘always already’ connected to Being from 
within the context of a system of meanings. 
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Conclusion 
In the forgoing, it was maintained that Positive Psychology requires a developed 
ontological underpinning to succeed in its aims to enhance human flourishing by the 
provision of a balance to the weakness model in Psychology since these require a 
comprehensive account of the human person. It was argued that Heidegger’s ontology 
could best supply this deficiency.  
 
It has been suggested that Positive Psychology assumes certain ideas which are 
prevalent within the Western philosophical and scientific traditions. The most 
problematic of these were an implicit acceptance of Dualism and an unswerving 
allegiance to the scientific outlook. Chapter one, ‘Heidegger’s Relevance for Positive 
Psychology,’ argued that reflection on Heidegger’s ontic-ontological distinction 
serves to clarify why the use of ontic research to come to a full understanding of the 
human person is a flawed enterprise. The flaw arises because Dasein has an 
appreciation of Being and is thus ontological in nature, so ontic research, while useful 
in discovering ontic facts, cannot speak to the fullness of human being. Furthermore, 
epistemological reasons for creating a base in Heidegger in order to make Positive 
Psychology more reliable were canvassed. This discussion points to a need for 
Positive Psychology to explicitly tackle the epistemological biases which come along 
with the theoretical attitude. 
 
The assumptions that Positive Psychologists work with impact the way in which they 
investigate and understand the human person. Chapter two, ‘Authenticity in 
Heidegger and Positive Psychology,’ highlighted that Positive Psychology uses a 
narrow concept of authenticity (which, moreover, suffers from inconsistencies in 
relation to temporality) in comparison to Heidegger’s more developed account. The 
ontic restrictions which Positive Psychology is bound by can be circumvented, and 
their notion of authenticity can be expanded upon, by an inclusion of an ontological 
structure of authenticity derived from Heidegger. Thus authenticity is made more 
accurate and distinct for Positive Psychology as not only that which ‘feels like the 
real me’ but that which comes from the awakened relation to one’s Being-in-the-
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world. Further research in this area should work toward an expanded and more 
detailed rendering of the ways in which Heidegger’s authenticity can enhance 
Positive Psychology’s use of the term. 
 
The hidden ontological biases within Positive Psychology become particularly 
evident in its treatment of the human mind. Chapter three, ‘Befindlichkeit and 
Dualism,’ made the radical proposal that Positive Psychology should abandon its 
unnamed Dualist outlook for one which comes closer to an accurate rendering of the 
experience of the human person.  The Dualist treatment of the person as split into 
mind and body coheres with the distinction drawn between the subject and the world. 
In general, the subject of Psychological research is distanced from the environment 
and asked to introspect. This approach only allows for the collection of information 
limited by these methodological constraints which, in turn, creates a distorted view of 
the human person. While it was admitted above that the scientific method is by-and-
large fruitful, it was suggested that it be tempered by an appreciation of how Dasein is 
attuned to the world, and ‘always already’ embedded within a world. This radical 
suggestion has implications for the methodology that Positive Psychology currently 
employs – providing an impetus for the development of new forms of experimental 
design. 
 
Chapter four, ‘Emotion and Mood,’ spent some time delineating the difficulties 
inherent in the description of emotion and mood within Positive Psychology, and 
suggested a schematic formula and Solomon’s rendition of emotion as possible means 
to providing clarity. What was gleaned from this investigation was that the main 
difference between Positive Psychology and Heidegger in relation to mood is that the 
latter does not relate mood beyond the individual’s experience of the world to her 
fundamental relatedness to Being. Again, Heidegger can support this ontic science by 
supplying reflection on ontological aspects of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Further 
work in this area would challenge Positive Psychology to clarify emotion as uses the 
term so that links to Heideggerian notions of mood can be seamlessly incorporated 
thus forging stronger links to Being. 
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The unaddressed theoretical biases within the strands which have been outlined above 
hamper Positive Psychology in its task of coming to a full and accurate understanding 
of the human person. This presents a particular difficulty for the field since it wishes 
to provide a balance to the one-sidedness of the weakness model within Psychology 
as a whole and to promote the means to human flourishing. Both of these ambitions 
require a complete picture of the human person in order to achieve success. Overall, 
the aims of Positive Psychology can be furnished by and acknowledgement of 
criticisms Heidegger raises against the Western Philosophical and scientific traditions 
and by the inclusion of an underpinning ontology which overcomes these criticisms – 
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